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Uzbekistan with distinguished characteristics appears as a key state to influence the
political stability of Central Asian states and the Russian Federation in the near future. Its
ethnically heterogeneous population, chronic economic problems inherited from the USSR
and the richness of natural energy resources make Uzbekistan the key state of the region.
The main focus of this thesis is to offer a detailed analysis of Uzbekistan's ethnic
structure and its probable effects on the political stabilization of the Central Asian states and
the Russian Federation. A secondary objective is to explore how Uzbekistan could continue
to provide a peace among its population and thereby prevent the destabilization of other
states.
Results of this study present a promising future for Uzbekistan, and therefore for the
stability of the region. Nevertheless, the study also shows that the continuity of stability
depends on the understanding of current realities by other concerned states and ethnic
minorities of Uzbekistan.
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I. INTRODUCTION
A. OVERVIEW
From the collapse of the USSR at the end of 1991, Uzbekistan, along with Kazakstan.
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan, emerged as one of the independent states of Central Asia. All
of these states inherited a problematic legacy. Artificial boundaries, ethnically heterogeneous
populations, centrally planned economies, and environmental degradation remained as problems from
the USSR. Uzbekistan, among these newly independent states, appears as a key state to influence the
political stability of the Central Asian states and the Russian Federation in the near future.
Uzbekistan's potential effectiveness is the result of its geographic location, ethnic structure, and
population characteristics. With the largest population of Central Asian states, Uzbekistan occupies the
heart of Central Asia. Minorities, such as Russians, Kazaks, Tajiks, and Tatars constitute almost
seventeen percent of Uzbekistan's twenty-two-million population. Also, approximately three million
Uzbeks live in the neighboring states including Afghanistan.
This thesis accomplishes three objectives. First, it offers a detailed analysis of Uzbekistan's
ethnic structure and the probable consequences of political destabilization of the Central Asian states
and the Russian Federation. Second, the thesis analyzes how Uzbekistan could continue to provide for
peace among its ethnic minorities and thereby prevent the destabilization of other concerned states.
Third, the thesis highlights the importance of Uzbekistan's well-being for Central Asian states and the
Russian Federation.
First of all, an ethnic conflict in Uzbekistan is possible because of the existence of ethnic groups.
Second, the initiation of ethnic conflicts depends on the existence or emergence of certain factors.
Following these assumptions is the main question of the thesis: Which factors are necessary for the
initiation of ethnic conflicts? The answer that is the main argument of the thesis is that ethnic conflicts
in Uzbekistan will initiate as a result of competition between ethnic groups for scarce resources.
Additionally, ethnic groups' feeling toward each other, cultural and daily relations, and perceptions will
very much affect the likelihood and the intensity of ethnic conflicts.
The structure of this thesis is as follows. Chapter I is an introduction, including theories about
ethnic conflicts, economic progress, and social stability. Chapter II has threeparts. First, it introduces
Uzbekistan and the limits of its geographical sources. Second, it provides a background for the feelings,
perceptions, and claims of the ethnic groups. And third, it examines the reasons for initiation of ethnic
conflicts and their development patterns by studying recent conflicts in Uzbekistan.
1
Chapter III examines the current ethnic, human rights, and social issues in Uzbekistan: relations
and feelings of ethnic groups, the human rights policy of Uzbekistan, and developuig social problems.
Chapter IV analyzes the probable reactions of neighboring countries to ethnic conflicts in Uzbekistan.
This chapter explains that the probable reactions of neighboring countries and the Russian Federation
will not be sufficient to cause the hostilities to cease once the ethnic groups come into conflict. Rather,
their reactions will tend to spread the conflict throughout the region. Furthermore, Chapter IV speculates
that a failure of the Russian Federation to protect the Russian-speaking minorities may result in the
political destabilization of the Russian Federation.
Chapter V examines the economic situation of Uzbekistan and offers that it is the modest
economic progress that has been providing a peace between ethnic groups in Uzbekistan since the fall
of the USSR. This chapter also analyzes the requirements of the continuity of economic progress of
Uzbekistan. Finally, Chapter VI provides an overview of the relationship between the economic progress




The Causes of Ethnic Conflicts
The contemporary literature on ethnic conflicts 1 is derived from the two main viewpoints:
primordiahsm and lnstrumentalism. 2 Their explanations about the reasons of ethnic conflicts constitute
the basic difference between them. Primordialists hold the view that political and economic changes
cannot erase the ethnical identities ofgroups. Two or more ethnic groups can come together and establish
a nation-state, but their identities cannot cease to exist even if their nation-state has politically or
economically developed. In time, their suppressed identities may be revived by a number of causes. This
revival of ethnic groups' identities in combination with the causes which spur the revival inevitably
initiates ethnic conflicts. According to Anthony Smith, the causes of ethnic revival are the growth of
' The literature on conflicts offers a large number of theories, such as individual assessment and calculation
of Thomas Hobbes, crowd mentality or collective innovation of irrationalists, value integration of Talcott
Parsons, relative deprivation and psychological theories of Aristotle, John Dollard, James C. Davies and Ted
Robert Gurr
,
group contention of Karl Marx, Vilfredo Pareto, and Charles Tilly. James B. Rule, Theories of
Civil Violence (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1 988). However, for the sake of clarity, it is necessary
to distinguish ethnic conflicts from the general concept of civil violence.
2 Anthony D. Smith, "Conflict and Collective Identity: Class, Ethnie and Nation," in Edward E. Azar and
John W. Burton, eds., International Conflict Resolution: Theory and Practice (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner
Publishers, Inc., 1 986) 63-84 and Ted Robert Gurr., Minorities at Risk (Washington, DC: United States
Institute of Peace Press, 1 993) 1 24.
intelligentsia, the impact of the modern, rational or scientific state on society, the impact of nationalist
ideology of the state, and the ethnic groups' desire to become the owner of their own states 3 Therefore,
to primordialists, the main cause of ethnic conflicts is the existence of two or more ethnic groups in one
nation-state.
Instrumentalists, on the other hand, primarily argue that the scarcity of resources in one
particular modernized state invites a competition between various groups, which identify themselves
according to their economic class or ethnic ties. 4 The viewpoint of Marxist instrumentalists who regard
the economic class ties as the principal denominator of competing groups is excluded from this thesis
because Marxism itself proved that it was a poor paradigm to understand human relations. The other
instrumentalists who regard the importance of ethnic ties, also, accept ethnic groups as the rational
political actors, and perceive the competition of ethnic groups as the rational pursuit of their interests.
Therefore, ethnic instrumentalists argue that because ethnic groups are rational actors their existence in
one nation-state does not necessarily cause conflicts among them. Peaceful coexistence can be achieved
by equal concession and accommodation. However, ethnic instrumentalists do not eliminate the
probability of conflicts between ethnic groups. They argue that peaceful coexistence of ethnic groups
depends on continuous surveillance and management of accommodation by state authorities. 5
Other ethnic conflict theories were also formulated in recent years, especially after the beginning
of various ethnic conflicts in Europe in the 1990s. However, except for the theory of Barry R. Posen.
these theories reflect the previous viewpoints of primordialists or instrumentalists. Accordmg to Posen.
the security dilemma of ethnically or religiously defined groups emerging from old multi-ethnic empires,
namely the USSR and Yugoslavia, affects their inter-group relations. Posen argues that because the main
reason of conflict between these groups is their fear from each other, it is necessary for the international
community to make these groups feel secure. 6 Jack Snyder, one of the other recent conflict theorists,
supports Posen's security dilemma formulation, but he also adheres to the pnmordialist viewpoint. He
argues that it is the aggressive nationalism that causes national conflicts. * Aggressive nationalism




5 Milton J. Esman, "Political and Psychological Factors in Ethnic Conflict," in Joseph V. Montville. ed ..
Conflict and Peacemaking in Multiethnic Societies (Lexington: Lexington Books, 1990) 53-61.
6
Barry R. Posen, "The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict," Survival . Vol.35, No. 1 (Spring 1993): 27-
47.
7
Professor Jack Snyder's 'national conflicts' include ethnic and non-ethnic conflicts among the groups of
one particular state. Jack Snyder, "Nationalism and the Crisis of the Post-Soviet State," Survival . Vol.35, No. 1
(Spring 1993): 5-26.
produces conflicts because of the following reasons: (1) security dilemma of groups, (2) intensification
of (ethnic) nationalistic ideology of one ethnic group, especially at the times of military or economic
threats to the state, and (3) ethnic definition of nationality which denies citizenship and protection to
other ethnically defined groups in the same state. However, he also argues that the main cause of
aggressive nationalism is the failure of states to meet military and economic threats to their people in
combination with restrictions on political participation of the other groups in the state's governing
structure.
The others combine previous approaches. 8 Stuart J. Kaufman, for example, formulates a theory
that the "ancient hatred" of primordialists, "inter-ethnic security dilemma" of Posen, and "manipulation
of belligerent leaders" are the causes of ethnic conflicts. He also shows us that the sources of hostility
between ethnic populations are the following: ethnically defined grievances, demographic threats,
negative ethnic stereotypes, a history of ethnic domination, ethnic symbols, a reciprocal fear of group
extinction, a de facto situation of anarchy, the military means to fight, and the political space for ethnic
outbidding. 9
However, according to Jack Snyder as one of the source of ethnic conflicts, the "ancient hatred"
approach misleads us. 10 Additionally, in the conclusion of Nationalism and Nationalities in the New
Europe, Professor Kupchan writes that, '
'
To be sure, historical tension between Slovaks and Czechs played a role in precipitating
the split of their country. So too did memories of past injustices intensify violence
during the breakup of Yugoslavia. But in both these cases, historical claims and
counterclaims need not have dominated the political discourse. . . . Past injustices
indeed played a role in intensifying nationalist sentiments, but historical memories were
more the tool of the propagandist than the original source of ethnic rivalry.
The security dilemma, a phenomenon of realist international relations paradigm, also, cannot
help us to understand the specific reasons of ethnic conflicts. It depends on the absence of a sovereign
8 David A Lake and Donald Rothchild, "Containing Fear: The Origins and Management of Ethnic Conflict,"
and Stuart J. Kaufman, "Spiraling to Ethnic War: Elites, Masses, and Moscow in Moldova's Civil War,"
International Security, Vol.2 1 , No. 2 (Fall 1 996) and Robert D. Kaplan, Balkan Ghosts: A Journey Through
History (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993).
q
Stuart J. Kaufman, "Spiraling to Ethnic War: Elites, Masses, and Moscow in Moldova's Civil War," 108-9
and 113.
10 Jack Snyder, "Nationalism and the Crisis of the Post-Soviet State," 5.
11 Charles A. Kupchan, "Conclusion," in Charles A. Kupchan, ed., Nationalism and Nationalities in the New
Europe (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1995) 182.
that causes anarchy. In this anarchical situation, every ethnic group tries to enhance its own security that
causes other ethnic groups' reactions in the same manner. At the end, ethnic groups" reactionary actions
to each other spiral into ethnic conflict.' 2 The security dilemma may explain the ethnic conflicts where
the state structure or sovereign has recently collapsed, and certainly offers a strong tool to understand
the relations between sovereign states. However, it makes an insignificant contribution to examine the
Fergana- 1989 conflict in Uzbekistan, which occurred suddenly against a small minority before the fall
of the USSR.
The "manipulation of belligerent leaders," also, does not offer a useful explanation to the
sources of ethnic conflicts since leaders cannot mobilize masses without "a wide and a deep sense of
grievance among ordinary people." 13 Even Kaufman says, "People do not engage in ethnic violence
unless they are hostile." 14
On the other hand. Lake and Rothchild argue that ethnic conflicts most often occur as a
consequence of collective fears of the future. To them, "collective fears of the future arise when states
lose their ability to arbitrate between groups or provide credible guarantees of protection for groups."
They, also, say that groups behave rationally in general, but they may be irrational under certain
conditions.' 5 One more explanation of the causes of ethnic conflicts comes from Donald Horowitz. He
writes that, 16
Where there is a split between indigenous and immigrant groups, it tends to coincide
with the split between backward and advanced groups. Backward-indigenous groups
'feel under siege in their own home/ a powerful feeling that often calls up determined
and violent political activity. Where backwardness and indigenousness conjoin, the
configuration of political claims and responses is predictable.
Consequently, according to their main viewpoints, the scholars of this field offer a number of causes of
ethnic conflicts. However, as it is put by Michael E. Brown, Senior Fellow in U.S. Security Policy and
Editor of Survival at the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London, 17
12 Barry R. Posen, "The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict," 27-9.
13 Ted Robert Gurr and Jack A. Goldstone, "Comparisons and Policy Implications," in Dana P. E\xe. ed..
Course Reader of NS 30 1
1
(Monterey: Naval Postgraduate School, Winter 1996) 334.
14
Stuart J. Kaufman, "Spiraling to Ethnic War: Elites, Masses, and Moscow in Moldova's Civil War," 1 12.
15 Lake and Rothchild, "Containing Fear: The Origins and Management of Ethnic Conflict," 4 1
.
16 Donald L. Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict , (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press,
1 985) 213. (Emphasis mine.)
17
Michael E. Brown, "Causes and Implications of Ethnic Conflict," in Michael E. Brown, ed., Ethnic Conflict
and International Security (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993) 12.
If political science was as advanced as the physical sciences, it might be possible to
integrate these . . . factors in an overarching theory of the causes of ethnic conflicts.
Sadly, that is not possible. It is not yet clear what conditions are necessary and
sufficient for the initiation of ethnic hostilities, nor is there a rigorous understanding of
why some conflicts are more intense than others.
Considering the characteristics of Uzbekistan as it is advised by Khazanov, 18 1 argue that the
main cause of an ethnic conflict is the scarcity of resources that simultaneously cause the deterioration
of the living conditions of the population and a competition between them for these scarce resources.
When people lose their current wealth sources (such as earnings, jobs, lands, herds, and houses) they
begin to seek the cause of their losses. If there are ethnically defined groups among these frustrated
populations, they may try to eliminate these ethnic groups on the grounds that the existence of these
ethnic groups is the cause of their misery. In other words, a "competition" for scarce resources begins
between them. The lack of cultural contacts between ethnic groups and their hostile or contemptuous
feelings toward each other, also, enhances the likelihood of an ethnic conflict. At the same time, ethnic
groups may revive or invent "symbols," such as religious flags and figures, find "belligerent leaders,"
and create "ethnic stereotypes."
2. Economic Progress and Social Problems
The Republic of Uzbekistan was the Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic (UzSSR) until the collapse
of the USSR. Therefore, the Republic ofUzbekistan inherited severe social and economic problems that
were common to all other socialist states. The cause of these problems was the centrally planned
economic structure of socialist states. For that reason, economists' theories for economic recovery and
development of former socialist states offer an economic reform for transition from centrally planned
economy to a market economy. They suggest that the implementation of three main economic
principles—stabilization, liberalization, and privatization— is necessary to be successful in transition. An
institutional reform to provide a legal framework for the implementation of these principles is another
requirement for success. 19
18
A. M. Khazanov, Professor of Social Anthropology at the University of Wisconsin, writes that, "National
movements are always shaped by the distinctive sociopolitical and economic features of the countries where
they take place." Anatoly M. Khazanov, After the USSR: Ethnicity, Nationalism, and Politics in the
Commonwealth of Independent States
.
(Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1995) 104.
iq Michael Mandelbaum, "Introduction," in Shafigul Islam and Michael Mandelbaum, eds.. Making Markets:
Economic Transformation in Eastern Europe and the Post-Soviet States (New York: Council on Foreign
Relations Press, 1993)3.
In addition to these principles and institutional reform, Professor Robert Campbell suggests two
more measures: "opening the economy to the external world," and "a system of social protection against
the costs the transition imposed on the population."20 Campbell believes that the future of economic
reform primarily depends on the behavior of population. He predicts three outcomes according to the
probable popular reactions: a social revolution as a result of economic problems of transition, abortion
of reform in favor of populist policies, or a success in transition to market economy without a social
revolution and populist policies, but with the implementation of necessary social protection. 21
This is the dilemma of transition countries. On the one hand, the application of the three main
principles on deteriorated social and economic structures inherited from the socialist era will inevitably
create a resentment among the population that may cause a social revolution in the short term. On the
other hand, in the long term, aborting reform in favor of populist policies will also result in social
explosion or revolution. In the case of Uzbekistan, as a result of social resentments, there is also the
probability of ethnic conflicts that are ready to complicate further the transition from plan to market.
The World Bank recommends a social policy to transition countries. The goals of this policy are
the elimination of their current social problems inherited from the socialist system and the protection of
population from the costs of transition. 22 First of all, these countries must firmly and consistently pursue
economic reform policy in order to obtain high growth rates in economic development that eventually
will eliminate discontent by decreasing unemployment and increasing employee benefits. Secondly,
providing enough social security measures, such as an effective health-care system, sufficient pensions
and minimum wages, they must ease the pain of transition and the current social problems of their
populations. According to World Development Report 1996, 23
In many countries [of transition] the largest problem, both politically and in terms of
demand on public resources, is state pensions. Generous access to pensions is one way
of cushioning the impact of transition on a generation that was prevented from
accumulating wealth in the previous system and has no opportunity to save in the new
market system.
20 Robert W. Campbell, "Economic Reform in the USSR and its Successor States," in Shafigul Islam and
Michael Mandelbaum, eds.. Making Markets: Economic Transformation in Eastern Europe and the Post-Soviet
States , 106.
21
Ibid, 135 and 113.
22 The World Bank, "People and Transition," in World Development Report 1 996: From Plan to Market
(Washington DC, 1996)66-84.
23 The World Bank, "Conclusions-and the Unfinished Agenda," in World Development Report 1996: From
Plan to Market (Washington DC, 1996) 144.
However, in the end the effectiveness of this policy depends on government revenues sufficiently
available to spend for social security requirements. During the communist system, revenues of transition
countries mainly came from taxes, union grants, and state enterprises. 24 Today, union grants cannot be
taken into account. State enterprises
1
former contribution to revenues may be replaced by revenues from
these enterprises' privatization. Nevertheless, revenues from privatization of unprofitable and outdated
state enterprises may not be enough to meet government expenditures.
Additionally, the current economic structure of Uzbekistan depends on agriculture. A high rate
of population growth, also, requires continuous expansion of this agricultural structure. However,
environmental problems do not allow further expansion of agriculture. It is obvious that the consequence
of restrictions on agriculture will be a substantial increase in unemployment which will certainly cause
ethnic conflicts. On the other hand, Uzbekistan possesses significant amount of other natural resources,
such as oil and natural gas, that have not been opened to the external world.
Consequently, considering Uzbekistan's economic and social situation and rich oil and natural
gas resources, I argue that the only possible way for Uzbekistan to gain enough revenues and create
additional employment opportunities in order to alleviate the cost of transition and prevent ethnic
conflicts is to export oil and natural gas.
24 The World Bank, Uzbekistan : An Agenda for Economic Reform (Washington, DC, 1 993) 277, Table 4.
Summary of Fiscal Operations for 1 987- 1991.
II. UZBEKISTAN AND THE UZBEKS
First, this chapter introduces Uzbekistan and the limits of its geographical sources. Second, it
provides a background for the feelings, perceptions, and claims of the ethnic groups. Third, it examines
the reasons for initiation of ethnic conflicts and their development patterns by studying recent conflicts
in Uzbekistan.
A. GEOGRAPHY
The Republic of Uzbekistan is located in the middle of Central Asian states (Figure 2.1).
Covering 447,400 square kilometers (172,700 square miles, slightly larger than California), it lies along
the ancient silk road between Europe and the Far East. It is surrounded on the north and northwest by
Kazakstan (2,203 km); on the east by Kyrgyzstan (1,099 km) and Tajikistan (1,161 km); on the south
by Afghanistan (137 km); on the southwest by Turkmenistan (1,621 km). 25
Almost three-fifths of Uzbekistan's land consists of steppe, desert, and semi-arid terrain. From
west to east, Uzbekistan is covered by the arid Ustyurt plateau, the southern part of the Aral Sea. the
delta of the Amudarya on the south of the Aral Sea, the Kyzylkum Desert, the valleys of Zeravshan.
Qashqadarya and Surkhandarya rivers, and the Fergana Valley. The Ustyurt plateau on the southwest
of the Aral Sea contains salt lakes, salt marshes and sand. There is no running water on the plateau, and
rain is nonexistent. Between the Aral Sea, the Syrdarya, the Zeravshan Valley, and the Amudarya lies
the Kyzylkum, the second largest desert of Central Asia. Long and hot summers, and mild winters are
the characteristics of Uzbekistan's climate. Rainfall averages eight inches per year, and temperatures
range from 32 degrees Fahrenheit in the winter to 130 degrees Fahrenheit in the summer.
25 Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook , (Washington, DC: Office of Public and Agency
Information, 1995)447.
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Figure 2.1 Uzbekistan26
Central Asia's two major rivers, the Amudarya on the south and Syrdarya on the north, flow
through Uzbekistan to the Aral Sea. The Amudarya begins in the Pamirs in Tajikistan. It runs, first,
along the border of Afghanistan with Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, then, along much of Uzbekistan's
southwestern border with Turkmenistan. While the Amudarya flows through Turkmenistan, it is fed by
the Surkhandarya, the Qashqadarya, and the Zeravshan River that come from Tajikistan through
Uzbekistan. At the same time, almost 20 percent water of the Amudarya flows to south Turkmenistan
by way of the Karakum Canal, which was built at the end of the 1950s. The second major river, the
National Technical Information Service, Uzbekistan An Economic Profile (Springfield, 1993) vi.
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Syrdarya, begins as the Naryn River in Kyrgyzstan. Later, merging with Karadarya, it becomes the
Syrdarya and flows through the Fergana Valley and Kazakstan to the Aral Sea. 2
Valleys and oases along the Amudarya, the Syrdarya. and their tributaries provide the only
suitable settlement areas and agricultural lands to the population of Uzbekistan. The largest and most
economically important one is the Fergana Valley in the east bounded on three sides by mountainous
Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. It stretches 300 kilometers and reaches 170 kilometers in width. Its center
is mainly desert and desert steppe, but its flanks contain many loess-rich foothills and mountain slopes.
Most of the Fergana Valley lies in Uzbekistan, but in the northeast it extends into Kyrgyzstan and in the
south it continues into Tajikistan. In Uzbekistan, the valley is divided into three distinct regions around
the cities of Andijan, Fergana, and Namangan. With a population of seven million people, the narrow
valley is the most densely populated region in Uzbekistan28 The other important settlement areas of
Uzbekistan comprise the valley of Zeravshan River between Samarkand, Nawoiy, and Bukhara, the
valleys of Surkhandarya and Qashqadarya, the Khiva (Khorezm) oasis on the Amudarya. the lands
around the Aral Sea, and Tashkent on the Syrdarya.
The Aral Sea on the Uzbekistan-Kazakstan border is fed only by the Amudarya and the
Syrdarya. These two rivers' water resources total to 127.5 cubic kilometers for the average year.
However, since the late 1950s, over 75 percent of these resources has been used by irrigation channels
for the purpose of expanding the agricultural hectarage devoted in large part to cotton and also to rice. 29
Moreover, in some dry years, the irrigation percentage nears to 100 percent (Table 2. 1). 30
27
Peter Sinnott, "The Physical Geography of Soviet Central Asia and the Aral Sea Problem," in Robert A.
Lewis, ed., Geographic Perspectives on Soviet Central Asia . (London: Routledge, 1992) 83.
28
Ibid., 8 1 ; Ahmed Rashid, The Resurgence of Central Asia: Islam or Nationalism? . (London : Zed Books,
1 994) 7-8, 84; Ahmed Rashid, "The Islamic Factor, Uzbekistan," in World Press Review . Vol.40, No.3
(March 1993): 45.
29 Michael H. Glantz, Alvin Z. Rubinstein, and Igor Zonn, "Tragedy in the Aral Sea Basin: Looking Back to
Plan Ahead?" in Hafeez Malik, ed., Central Asia. Its Strategic Importance and Future Prospects , (New York:
St. Martin's Press, 1994) 167.
30
Peter Sinnott, "The Physical Geography of Soviet Central Asia and the Aral Sea Problem," 83.
11
Table 2.1 Inflow into the Aral Sea, 31
(cubic kilometers)
Amudarya Svrdarva Total
1959 40.0 18.3 58.3
1968 28.9 7.2 36.1
1977 7.2 0.4 7.7
1989 N/A N/A 4.3
199632 N/A N/A 1.0
Because of this excessive irrigation, since the early 1960s the Aral Sea has shrunk by more than
two-thirds and continues to recede. In some places it has retreated more than 1 50 kilometers. Ports such
as Muynak. which used to support a fishing industry employing 50,000 people in the 1960s, are now
separated from what is left of the Aral by up to 145 km of desert. 33
Besides the rising mineralization level in the water of the Aral Sea, wind storms containing salt
and dust are some of the other results of this dramatic recession. Moreover, the contents of salt and dust,
which are being carried by these storms, changes the Aral Sea affair to a serious international problem
that requires common efforts of Central Asian states and international organizations. Dust and salt from
the dried-up sea bed includes the remnants of fertilizers, defoliants, and pesticides, as well as heavy
metals, such as lead, aluminum, and cadmium, formerly trapped in the sea mud. The dried-up sea bottom
now covers an area of more than 30,000 square kilometers, and salt and dust storms arising from its
surface carry some 75 million tons annually34 which is equal to half a ton of salt and dust on each hectare
around the Aral Sea. 35 The heavier salt particles settle within the radius of 400-500 kilometers while the
lighter particles are carried to much greater distances. Some of this noxious material reach the fertile
31
Ibid., 87, Table 4.1.
32 Amembassy Tashkent, "Uzbekistan: Visit to Kharezm and Karakalpakistan," August 8, 1996,
at http://www.itaiep.doc.gov/bisnis/cables/960808uz.html.
33 Daniel Butler, "Water the Next Source of Trouble," Euromoney World Link Magazine ,
November/December 1995 at http://emwl.oyster.co.uk/contemts/publications/worldluik/wl.95.
34
Peter Sinnott, "The Physical Geography of Soviet Central Asia and the Aral Sea Problem," 86.
35 Douglas Busvine, "World Tries to Soften Impact of Aral Sea's Demise," Reuters World Service,
September 17, 1995.
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Fergana Valley and Georgia on the Black Sea coast. 36 According to Ze'ev Wolfson of the Hebrew
University of Jerusalem, Aral's toxic salts fall with the rain in Latvia, Belorussia. and Poland. 37
Naturally, the Aral Sea disaster primarily has been afflicting the population living around the
Aral Sea in Kazakstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan. In Uzbekistan they are the 1.45 million people
of the Karakalpakistan Autonomous Republic of Uzbekistan. Since their lands and even their piped water
is heavily polluted, in 1995, 97 percent the women of Karakalpakistan were classified as anemic as a
result of lead poisoning. As well as anemia, the people of Karakalpakistan also suffer from rising rates
of kidney and thyroid disease, and of esophageal, stomach, and liver cancers. In parts of Karakalpakistan
life expectancy is twenty years less than the average for the rest of the former Soviet Union. Four out of
five are born anemic, and one in twenty has a congenital disorder. Infant mortality exceeds 80 per
thousand live births in places, and averages about 45 per thousand. This is 50 percent above the average
for Uzbekistan, and the highest rate in the former Soviet Union. 38
Although Central Asians have recognized the importance of the desiccation of the Aral Sea
since the early 1980s, they have not yet been able to implement any regulation to stop the desiccation.
On June 23, 1990, the presidents of Kazakstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan
signed a joint declaration, stating that the growing deficit and pollution of water resources put the Aral
Sea basin on the edge of ecological ruin that necessitates serious efforts of the central government of
the USSR. 39 Just after the independence of Central Asian states, a joint statement issued by the water
management authorities of each state in October 1991, said that "there was an inevitability of a
complex situation due to an increasing water deficit and aggravation of ecological tensions in the basin
of the Aral Sea."40 In March 1992, the five Central Asian states agreed to equal rights to water
resource-use and equal responsibility for its conservation, but no measures could be adopted to improve
the ecological situation in the Aral basin except for a guarantee that the Aral Sea would receive 10.5
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Hygiene Association Journal , Vol.57, No. 12 (December 1996): 1096-1 102, Amebassy Tashkent, "Uzbekistan:
Visit to Kharezm and Karakalpakistan," August 8, 1 996, at
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cubic kilometers of water from both rivers annually. In March 1993, an agreement was reached in
principle to improve the situation in the Aral Sea basin, and the International Fund for Saving the Aral
Sea (IFAS) was set up. They also established a committee-Interstate Council for the Aral Sea (ICAS)-to
coordinate their efforts. 41
In 1995, an international conference under the auspices of the UN on sustainable development
ofthe Aral Sea basin was held in Nukus, the capital of Karakalpakistan. The presidents of Kazakstan,
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan met at this conference and signed the Nukus Declaration on
September 20, 1995. Turkmenistan's president was not able to attend but has said he will sign at a later
date. By the Nukus Declaration, they confirmed that, 42
The Aral Sea crisis is a result of unsustainable policies towards the environment and
use of natural resources, and the principle cause has been the excessive withdrawal
of water for irrigation along the courses of the Amudarya and Syrdarya rivers.
Finally, at a summit in Almaty on February 28,1 997, the leaders of Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan,
Uzbekistan, and Kazakstan agreed to allot 0.3 percent of their countries' gross domestic product to the
International Fund for Saving the Aral Sea (IFAS). Only Tajik President said that due to the difficult
situation in his country, Tajikistan would not be able to contribute to the fund. In addition to these
countries' contribution, the World Bank which has already granted $41 million to the IFAS, is planning
to provide a total of $380 million by 2000 to help cope with the ecological disaster in the Aral Sea. 43
Also, the European Union which its executive European Commission has already provided $5.89 million
for a project on Water Resources Management and Agricultural Production is drawing up several
schemes to help improve the environmental situation around the Aral Sea. 44 Consequently, the Aral Sea
tragedy demonstrates the limits of geographic resources of Uzbekistan which would prohibit sustaining
or expanding the agricultural sector which already requires an excessive amount of irrigation.
41
Ibid.
42 Amebassy Tashkent, "Nukus Declaration" on the Aral Sea Basin," September 26, 1995, at
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Liberty . February 28, 1997.
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B. HISTORY
In this section, the evolution of ethnic groups in Uzbekistan and their feelings toward each other
will be examined. As aforementioned, feelings of ethnic groups are not the causes of the initiation of
ethnic conflicts. However, as it is explained by Professor Kupchan,45 these feelings ("past injustices,"
"ancient hatred," and "historical memories") make ethnic groups ready to initiate conflicts and intensify'
conflicts after they are initiated.
1. Who Are the Uzbeks?
According to Porkhomovsky, (a senior researcher at the Institute of Linguistics, Russian
Academy of Sciences,) Turkic tribes began to appear in Central Asia in the fifth or sixth century A. D. 46
Their first known state was the Gokturk Empire or the Great Turkish Kaganate which was founded in
552 A.D. Today, Azerbaijan, Kazakstan, Turkey, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan are planning to
celebrate the 1450th anniversary of the Gokturk Empire. 47 In 705, the Muslim Arabs came to Central
Asia, conquered Bukhara and Samarkand, and introduced Islam to Central Asians. 48 Turkic tribes'
acceptance of Islam en masse began toward the end of ninth century. In the twelfth century, the Yeseviye
path of Sufism, which was founded by Ahmed Yesevi began to flourish among the Turks of Central Asia
all the way to Kazan, Azerbaijan, and Anatolia in the west49 and to Fergana Valley, Bukhara, and
Samarkand in the south. Yesevi died in 1 166 50 near the city Yesi in southern region of modem-day
Kazakstan. 5 ' Almost two hundred years after, in the fourteenth century, Amir Timur of Uzbeks built a
magnificent mausoleum to Ahmed YeseviS2 in Yesi which is still one of the most venerated holy places
of pilgrimage of all Central Asia. 53
45 See footnote 13.
46 Victor Ya. Porkhomovsky, "Historical Origins of Interethnic Conflicts in Central Asia and Transcaucasia,
inVitaly V. Naumkin, ed., Central Asia and Transcaucasia: Ethnicity and Conflict (Westport: Greenwood
Press, 1994) 12.
47 The Tashkent Declaration of Turkic states, October 21,1 996. Narodnoye Slavo, Tashkent, "Text of
declaration at Turkic summit in Tashkent," BBC Record Number: .00805* 1 996 1 022*00320 in Global
NewsBank.
48 Ahmed Rashid, The Resurgence of Central Asia: Islam or Nationalism? 12.
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50
Ibid., 419.
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From the second half of ninth century to 1220, several independent Turk and Persian Khanates
and Emirates replaced each other in Central Asia: the Samanids (874-990), the Karahans (990-1212),
and the Khorazmians (1 157-1220) between Syrdarya and Amudarya; the Ghaznavids (989-1 149) in
Afghanistan, Pakistan, and northern India; the Seljuks (1040-1299) first in Turkmenistan and northern
Afghanistan then in the Middle East and Anatolia. 54
All these states, except the Khorazmians, were created as tribal confederations under a dominant
tribe and named after the dominant tribe or the leaders of the dominant tribes. In many cases, without
relinquishing their original names, subject tribes also identified themselves with the name of the
confederation. Thus the name of a powerful leader who subjugated the other tribes became the name of
a nation in the course of time. 55
One more tribal confederation, the Mongols, which would eventually dominate Central Asia,
central and eastern Europe, and the Middle East was constituted under the banner of Genghis Khan in
Mongolia in 1206. In the next twelve years, this confederation included all the tribes that today make up
the major ethnic groups in Central Asia except the Tajiks. 56 From 1237 onward, Batu Khan, the grandson
of Genghis Khan (Figure 2.2) and the founder of the Golden Horde, began his expedition to the west to
bring central and eastern Europe under the dominion of the Mongols. During Batu Khan's Hungarian
Campaign, Sheiban, the fifth son of Juchi Khan, accompanied his brother Batu. After this campaign,
Batu gave Sheiban the administration of the lands between the Caspian Sea, Aral Sea, Lake Balkash and
the Urals, and four nomadic tribes57 which were living there since the 6 th century. 58
54 Ahmed Rashid, The Resurgence of Central Asia: Islam or Nationalism? 13; Kemal Karpat, "The old and
new Central Asia," 4 1 5-425; Henry H. Howorth, History of the Mongols Part I The Mongols Proper and the
Kalmuks (New York: Burt Franklin, ? first published in London in 1876) 5-8.
55 Henry H. Howorth, History of the Mongols: Part II The So-called Tartars of Russia and Central Asia
Division I (New York: Burt Franklin, ? first published in London in 1 880) 9; Zeki Velidi Togan, "The Origins
of the Kazaks and the Ozbeks," in H. B. Paksoy, ed., Central Asia Reader: The Rediscovery of History (New
York: M. E. Sharpe, 1994) 28-32; Edward Allworth, The Modem Uzbeks: From the Fourteenth Century to the
Present, 31.
56 Henry H. Howorth, History of the Mongols Part I The Mongols Proper and the Kalmuks, 62-90.
57 Henry H. Howorth, History of the Mongols: Part II The So-called Tartars of Russia and Central Asia
Division II (New York: Burt Franklin, ? first published in London in 1880) 978 and Edward Allworth, The
Modern Uzbeks: From the Fourteenth Century to the Present , 7, Figure 1.1.
















































Figure 2.2 Genealogical Tree of the Rulers of the Golden Horde 59
In 1312, Uzbeg Khan who was previously converted to Islam became the ruler of the Golden
Horde. Uzbeg Khan seized the throne from his uncle's pagan son, Tukul, with the help of Kutlugh Ming
Timur. Because of his help, Uzbeg Khan rewarded Kutlugh Timur by giving him the administration of
Khorazm which comprised the Karakalpakistan (part of the modern-day Uzbekistan.) Uzbeg Khan's
term was one of the most glorious era of the Golden Horde. He was wise, powerful and very skillful. In
5
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1313, he granted special favors to the Russian clergy that allowed the Russian church to achieve
paramount influence in Russian life. Fifteen years later, he summoned Ivan Danilovitch, Prince of
Moscow, conferred on him the Grand Principality of Russia, and killed his rivals. While Prince Ivan was
a vassal ofUzbeg Khan, the Russian church was moved from Vladimir to Moscow on August 4, 1326.
From this date, Moscow became the political and religious capital of Russia. Uzbeg Khan was also the
father-in-law of the Muslims'' Caliph and the son-in-law of the Byzantine Emperor. Moreover, accordmg
to a letter of the Pope John XXII, Uzbeg Khan was well known for the kindness he had shown the other
Christians and allowed the Catholic Church to introduce Christianity into the countries bordering on the
Black Sea. Toward the end of Uzbeg Khan's reign (1312-1340), his realm extended from Crimea to
northern Afghanistan and Tajikistan.60 At the same time, tribes living around the Aral Sea, Caspian Sea,
Lake Balkash, and modern-day Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and northern Afghanistan that nominally belonged
to Kutlugh Timur embraced the term Uzbeg as their common name.
However, for Russians, the era of the Golden Horde was the beginning of "an inferiority
complex and a need for revenge." As it is put by preeminent author of Balkan Ghosts,6}
To understand Russian realities today one has to have a concept of the great Turkic
ethnic group that has preoccupied Russians through the centuries. . . . And ever
since the days of Ivan the Terrible [Ivan IV, one of the successor of Ivan I or Ivan
Danilovitch], . .
.
, the Russians, burdened with an inferiority complex and a need for
revenge, have been on the offensive against the Turkic peoples.
After the death of Berdibeg Khan in 1359, a strife ensued among Uzbeg Khan's grandsons for
the throne of the Golden Horde. 62 During this chaos, in 1369, Amir Timur (1336-1405), one of the
commanders of Kutlugh Timur's Samarkand Governor and the cousin of the leader of Uzbeg Barlas
tribe, proclaimed himself as the Amir of Transoxiana~the region between the Amudarya and the
Syrdarya. 63 Between 1379 and 1402, Amir Timur expanded his rule from Samarkand to as far as
Moscow. Timur died in 1405. Neither the empire nor the dynasty created by him lasted long. However,
Amir Timur's era marked the beginning of an enormous sociological transformation that the Uzbek
60 Henry H. Howorth, History of the Mongols: Part II The So-called Tartars of Russia and Central Asia
Division I . 148-72.
61 Robert D. Kaplan, "Shatter zone: Central Asia," The Atlantic . Vol. 269, No.4 (April 1992).
62 Henry H. Howorth, History of the Mongols: Part II The So-called Tartars of Russia and Central Asia
Division I , 195.
63 Michael Prawdin, The Mongol Empire: Its Rise and Legacy
. 4 1 1 -34; Zeki Velidi Togan, "The Origins of
the Kazaks and the Ozbeks," 30-7.
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culture, customs, language (Uzbek)64
,
"and the Genghisid political legacy were combined and retained
along with Islamic identity and institutions and the sufi folk religion."65 This transformation continued
after Amir Timur so that in the end the term "Uzbek" began to designate not a tribe or a tribal
confederation, but a proto-nation, settled mostly in modern-day Uzbekistan and its near abroad, with
distinctive cultural characteristics.
2. Russian Conquest of Central Asia and Consequences
In the course of time, without well-defined borders, three Uzbek states emerged on the territory
of modem-day Uzbekistan, northern Turkmenistan, northern Afghanistan, and Tajikistan. They were the
Khanate of Khiva around Khiva and the Aral sea, the Emirate of Bukhara centered on the Zeravshan
Valley, and the Khanate of Kokand (Khokand or currently Quqon) in the Fergana Valley that came face
to face with the Russian Empire in the middle of 19th century (Figure 2.3).
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Figure 2.3 Central Asia in the Middle of 19 th Century 66
The penetration of the Russian Empire into the Khanates of Kokand and Khiva and the Bukhara
Emirate began in 1 853. It was not an invited or peaceful operation. The Russians first seized the fort of
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Aq Meshit from the Khanate of Kokand in the summer of 1853. Kokand did not accept the loss of Aq
Meshit quietly. In the fall of the same year it sent two contingents to re-conquer Aq Meshit; they were
not successful, however. At the same time, the Russians seemed satisfied with the conquest of Aq Meshit
and stopped their further expansion to the south. This created a short peace between the Russian Empire
and Central Asian states. 67
The peace lasted until 1865. In November 1864, Prince Gorchakov, the Russian Foreign
Minister, circulated a memorandum to the major Powers of Europe in order to explain the reasons of the
coming Russian conquest of Central Asia. Prince Gorchakov declared that,68
The position of Russia in Central Asia is that of all civilized states which are brought
into contact with half-savage nomad populations possessing no fixed social
organization. In such cases it always happens that the more civilized state is forced, in
the interests of the security of its frontiers and its commercial relations, to exercise a
certain ascendancy over those whose turbulent and unsettled character make them
undesirable neighbors.
However, thirty-five years after Prince Gorchakov's declaration, Governor General of Turkistan,
Dukhovskii, observed that, "People speak of our civilizing role in Central Asia. At this juncture our
cultural influence is remarkable for its nonexistence."69
According to the explanations of Professor Fuller, the existence of independent Islamic states
in Central Asia was another compelling reason for Russian expansion. Fuller tells us that, the rebellion
of Muslim Sheikh Samil in the newly conquered Caucasian region [modern-day Chechnya] of the
Russian Empire in the 1850s persuaded Russians to exterminate all the independent and Muslim Central
Asian states. 70
In the next nine years after Gorchakov's formulation of the Russian interests in Central Asia,
first Kokand, then Bukhara and Khiva Khanates became involuntary vassals of the Russian Empire.
Also, some parts of their territories were occupied and made into the Turkistan province of the Russian
Empire. The first major center in the region that was occupied by the Russians in 1865 was Tashkent.
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Although Tashkent belonged to Kokand before the occupation, it was the Emir of Bukhara who asked
die Russians to evacuate Tashkent and also waged a 'guerrilla war' against the occupation forces on the
territory of the Khanate of Kokand. 71 After two years of expansion, the conquered territories were
reorganized so that the Governor-Generalship of Turkistan, with the capital at Tashkent, was established
by a decree of Tsar Alexander II on July 11,1 867. 72 In January 1 868, the Turkistan Governor-General
signed a commercial treaty with the Khan of Kokand, which placed Kokand under complete economic
dependence to the Russian Empire. Four months after the conclusion of this treaty Bukhara proclaimed
a holy war and attacked Turkistan Governor-General. Bukhara's holy war lasted two months and was
ended with the victory of Russians. On June 30, 1 868, the defeated Emir was compelled to sign a peace
treaty that put Bukhara under Russian suzerainty. 73 The Khanate of Khiva, unlike Bukhara and Kokand,
could not strongly resist the Russian troops. Khiva, the capital with 1 8,000 residents, surrendered in May
1873 after two months of a weak and uncoordinated defense by the Khanates' soldiers. 74 On August 12,
1873, the Khan of Khiva, who was newly appointed by Russians after the conquest, signed a peace treaty
without arguing the conditions imposed by the Governor-General of Turkistan. 75
However, these treaties would not be able to establish peace in Bukhara, Khiva, and Kokand.
It was not long after the signing of the last treaty that a rebellion, which was directed against the Emir
of Bukhara and the Russian troops, broke out in the mountainous regions of eastern Bukhara. 6 Also,
between 1873-74, there was intense unrest in the Khanate of Kokand. In July 1875, one more rebellion
broke out in the Fergana Valley of Kokand. After this rebellion, St. Petersburg abolished the Khanate
of Kokand and established the Fergana oblasti under the jurisdiction of Turkistan Government-General
in 1876. 77
Although major reasons for Russian expansion into Central Asia were the civilization of "half-
savage nomad populations" and the elimination of independent Muslim Khanates which were
contributing uprisings in Russia's newly annexed territories, the Russian government launched an
71 Michael Rywkm, Moscow's Muslim Challenge: Soviet Central Asia (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1990) 1 1.
Professor Rywkin does not use the term 'guerrilla war', but the "harassment of armed Bukharan bands."
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A Century of Russian Rule (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967) 142.
74 Henry H. Howorth, History of the Mongols: Part II The So-called Tartars of Russia and Central Asia
Division II . 952-9.






economic policy beginning from 1869 that greatly contributed to the development of hatred among
Central Asia's indigenous peoples toward the Russians. At the time of the Russian arrival, Central Asian
farmers were primarily utilizing natural river flooding lands or areas watered by springs. Artificial
irrigation by canal systems, which had been used in the Fergana Valley, and around Tashkent,
Samarkand, Bukhara and Khiva since tenth century, was not extensive. As a result of the American Civil
War, which diminished the cotton exports to Russia from the USA, and the increasing cotton needs of
Russia's rapidly growing industry in the 1860s, the Russians concluded that they should concentrate their
efforts upon Central Asia's lands available for cotton farming in order to end the Russian Empire's
reliance on sources of cotton supply outside the empire. 78 As it is shown in Table 2.2, during the
American Civil War trade in raw and processed cotton with Central Asia increased by almost 300
percent.
Table 2.2 Russia's Trade with Central Asia, 1840-67 (Excluding Kazakstan)79
(in million Rubles)








In 1869, five years after the conquest of Tashkent and one year after the peace treaty with
Bukhara, the first survey of irrigable lands was conducted in the Mirzachol Sahra west of Tashkent. In
1874, unpaid native laborers began digging a canal from the Syrdarya. In addition, there were other
projects to increase the amount of irrigated lands. 80 Moreover, beginning from 1893 the Russian
government began to encourage the cotton monoculture in the region by lowering the freight rate on grain
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shipped to Turkistan. 81 Russian efforts for self-reliance on the supplies of cotton soon gave positive
results in cotton production, but created disastrous effects on grain production as well as on the Uzbek
peasants of the cotton lands. The Fergana Valley, for example, became one of the major cotton suppliers
to Russia,82 but also a main grain-deficit area of Turkistan Government-General. 83
Immigration of Russians to Central Asia was another factor that caused disruptive impacts on
nomads, besides the indigenous farmers. In 1896, the Resettlement Administration of Russia was
established to promote colonization and Russian squatters were given protection against the claims of
native farmers and nomads. Furthermore, after the peasant uprisings of 1905 to 1907 in European parts
of the Russian Empire, the land available for the settlement of Russians was enlarged by 70 percent by
lowering the norms defining the land needs of the nomads. 84
Yearly famines among the indigenous peoples of Central Asia between 1910 and 1913 were the
result of grain-deficit and the expropriation of lands from the nomads. 85 Another result of Russian
existence and policies in Central Asia was the continuous uprisings of indigenous peoples. As
aforementioned, the Khanate of Kokand had been abolished after the 1 875 rebellion. However, rebellions
throughout the region continued after the abolishment of the Kokand Khanate. The first revolt broke out
in 1885 in Andijan, Osh, and Marghilan districts of the Fergana oblasti. The 1891 riot in Namangan,
another district of Fergana, followed the 1885 rebellion. Then, in 1892, the Tashkent riot burst out. It
was again in Andijan that another revolt erupted in 1898. 86 It began on May 17, 1898 in a village of
Andijan and quickly spread to Andijan city and the other towns of Fergana Valley. On the next day, a
crowd of 2000 attacked Russian Army barracks in Andijan and killed twenty-two and wounded twenty-
four soldiers. After the suppression of revolt, there were 226 death sentences and 777 prison sentences. 8
The last revolt during the time of the Russian Empire began in Uzbek country at Khojand
(northern region of modern-day Tajikistan) on July 4, 1916. Spreading to Jizzakh (of Uzbekistan) on
July 13, it grew into a real uprising. Some local officials and Russians were killed, others were arrested.
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and communication facilities were destroyed. Very soon other disorders in most of the cities in Turkistan
Government-General followed these uprisings. First, in Margilan, Namangan and Andijan in the Fergana
Valley, then on the Kyrgyz and Kazak plains, conflicts between Central Asians and Russians began.
Russian immigrants took advantage of Russian officials' support to confiscate the possessions of Central
Asians. Additionally, immigrants formed armed groups which massacred the local population. The
Central Asians also responded in the same manner. Consequently, the region remained an arena of
bloody fighting until the end of August 1916. 88
There were other rebellions against the Emir of Bukhara in 1 9 1 and 1913, and against the Khan
of Khiva in 1874. 1875, 1877, 1915 and 1916 which required armed interventions of Turkistan
Government-General on behalf of the rulers of Bukhara and Khiva. 89 According to Professor Helene
Carrere d'Encausse,90
All [Central Asian] revolts followed the same pattern . . . and their troops were formed
of farmers and artisans from the towns, whose living conditions had worsened
considerably . . . Russian industrial competition, the chaos existing in the agrarian
relations, the dispossession of the peasants, and finally the excesses of the
administration and the whole of the Russian population contributed greatly to the
unrest.
These famines, massacres, and conflicts were still the causes of anti-Russian feeling in
Uzbekistan at the end of 1980s. An example of this is Gulchehra Nurullaeva, a well-known Uzbek
poetess who said in 1989 that these "atrocities" were historical reasons for enmity of Uzbeks toward
Russians. 91
3. The "National Delimitation"
Just after the uprising and suppression of 1916 in Central Asia, the February Revolution
occurred in St. Petersburg. From February 1917 to February 1918, Muslim Central Asians did not
oppose or support either the Provisional Government of St. Petersburg or the Bolsheviks. During the
Provisional Government's reign, Central Asian Muslims held two congresses. The first one was
88 Helene Carrere d'Encausse, "The Fall of the Czarist Empire," in Edward Allworth, ed., Central Asia: A
Century of Russian Role (New York: Columbia University Press, 1 967) 210-1.
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convened in April 1917 by 450 delegates, including 93 Russians, and voted for resolutions demanding
the cessation of Russian rule in Central Asia and the return of confiscated lands to the local population.
They also concluded that their destiny should not be unilaterally determined by Russia. In the second
congress in September 1917, Central Asians demanded the creation of an autonomous republic of
Turkistan which would be federated with Russia. They also declared their opposition to intensive cotton
cultivation because of severe grain shortages and famines, which were direct or indirect results of cotton
farming. 92
In the next two months, the Bolsheviks began to take power in the Russian Empire. In November
1917, the third regional congress of Soviets and the third regional Muslim congress were held in
Tashkent. While the congress of Soviets proclaimed the authority of the Soviets over all Turkistan. the
third Muslim congress suggested the formation of a coalition government with Soviets of Tashkent and
local autonomy for Turkistan. Because Central Asian Muslims' proposals were not accepted by the
Bolsheviks, the fourth congress of Muslims in Kokand on November 25, 1917, elected a council of 36
Muslims and 18 Russians and proclaimed the autonomy of southern Central Asia. 93
Their declaration of autonomy was not acceptable for the new Bolshevik government of Russia.
In February 1918, the Bolshevik troops from Orenburg entered the city Kokand and sacked it. 94 "Even
by writers sympathetic to the Bolshevik cause, admit that there were senseless looting and slaughter that
reached monstrous proportions."95 The total number of massacred Kokandians was between 10.000 and
50,000 out of 120,000 total population. 96
In the next thirty months after Kokandians' short lived autonomy, the Bolsheviks expanded their
rule all over Central Asia. They captured Khiva in February 1919 and Bukhara in September 1920.
Simultaneously, local communists, who were nationalists until 1918, proclaimed the Khorazm (Khiva)
People's Republic and the Bukhara People's Republic. 97 Thus, toward the end of 1920, there were three
communist states in Central Asia: Turkistan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (ASSR) of the
USSR, and "independent" Khorazm and Bukhara People's Republics (Figure 2.4).
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Figure 2.4 Central Asian Socialist Republics98
In June 1923, Stalin decided that the Soviets wanted to "transform Turkistan into a model
republic, into an advanced post for revolutionizing the East"99 However, according to the officials of
the USSR and the independent republics, the Central Asian states' economic structures and human
resources, which were devastated by continuous uprisings, famines, and the Civil War, were not suitable
to make them impressive examples of socialist development theories. For example, Turkistan SSR's
indigenous human resources declined approximately twenty-five percent between 1917-1920. 100
Perhaps, Central Asian nationalist intellectuals transformed themselves into communist leaders
of Turkistan (Bukhara, Khiva and Kokand) during the Bolshevik Revolution and the Civil War because
of this decline in human resources of Turkistan. Faizullah Khojaoglu, Abdur Rauf Fitrat, Munawwar
Qan, Abdulla Qadiriy, Cholpan, and Tawallo were those nationalist intellectuals who defined themselves
as communists beginning from 1918. Faizullah Khojaoglu, for example, was the leader of nationalist
Young Bukharans until 1920, the President of Bukhara People's Republic between 1920 and 1924, and
the Chairman of Uzbek SSR's Council of People's Commissars (Prime Minister) from 1925 to 1937.
Abdur Rauf Fitrat, another nationalist Young Bukharan, was commissar (minister) of education of
"8 Donald S. Carlisle, "Geopolitics of Uzbekistan," in Yaacov Ro'i, ed., Muslim Eurasia: Conflicting
Legacies (London: FRANK CASS, 1 995) 94, Map 5.1.




Bukhara People's Republic until the spring of 1923. They all wanted to create one national and
independent state in Central Asia. 101 However, they accepted the terms of the Bolsheviks in the end. As
it was observed by Thomas Hobbes, 'The Passions that encline men to Peace, are Feare of Death; . . .
.
And Reason suggesteth convenient Articles of Peace, upon which men may be drawn to agreement."102
Tawallo's explanation for their agreement with the Bolsheviks was very close to Hobbes s observation
When he was asked why he had ceased his nationalist activities after 1 9 1 8, he gave the following answer:
The Bolsheviks would have killed an unlimited number of people if Central Asians had continued to
pursue their nationalist ambitions. After 30 or 40 years of such vast killing, he added, the Uzbeks and
other Central Asian people would have disappeared or been transformed into slaves. Because of this
reason, he concluded, he gave way to communism and advised Cholpan to do the same thing. 103
The leaders of the USSR and the three socialist Central Asian republics found a solution within
Marxist thought to insufficient economic and human resources of Central Asian states. Like Marx and
Lenin, Stalin and the other leaders had believed that national consciousness would inevitably be replaced
by the international proletariat solidarity which would also erase national loyalties, hatreds and tensions
between ethnic groups. 104 Working with this theory, the communist leaders of aforementioned states
concluded that transfers of resources, including peoples, from the richer to the poorer republics would
solve their problems and create magnificent examples of socialism in Central Asia. According to the
official terminology of the USSR, it was the policy of "the gradual equalization of levels of development
of the national republics" which was also a stated objective of five-years plans even until 1972. 105
For the realization of Stalin's dreams, first, in 1923, the indigenous Communist parties
abolished the Khorezm and the Bukhara People's Republics and replaced them with the Khorezm and
Bukhara Soviet Socialist Republics. Second, the Turkistan, Bukhara, and Khorezm Communist Parties
passed resolutions demanding "national delimitation" based on economic and linguistic characteristics
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of Central Asia which had been approved by the Central Asian Bureau of the Central Committee of the
Russian Communist Party on April 13, 1924. 106 In May 1924, the Central Asian Bureau established the
Commission on National Delimitation to figure out the creation of new administrative units in Central
Asia. Then, the Turkistan, Bukhara, and Khorezm SSRs dissolved themselves in September and October
1924. Finally, on October 27, 1924, when the Central Executive Committee of the USSR approved the
delimitation proposal of the Commission on National Delimitation, six new administrative units came
into existence. They were Uzbek and Turkmen Soviet Socialist Republics, Tajik and Kazak Autonomous
Soviet Socialist Republics (ASSR), and Kara-Kyrgyz and Karakalpak Autonomous Oblasts (AO). Uzbek
and Turkmen SSRs were constituent part of the USSR. Tajik ASSR was under jurisdiction of the Uzbek
SSR. Kara-Kyrgyz and Karakalpak AOs were linked to Kazak ASSR, which was federated with the
Russian SFSR. 107
In the following years the "equalization of the national republics" continued. The Karakalpak
AO was linked to the Russian SFSR in 1930, raised to ASSR status in 1932, and transferred to the
jurisdiction of the Uzbek SSR in 1936. At the same year, the Kara-Kyrgyz AO, which was elevated to
ASSR in 1926, became the Kyrgyz SSR The Tajik ASSR was detached from the Uzbek SSR and raised
to the status of the Tajik SSR in 1929. The regions of the republics were also continuously transferred
between Central Asian SSRs in order to equalize their resources. For example, Osh, Jelalabad, and
Uzgen, which were populated mainly by Uzbeks were handed over to the Kyrgyz AO. 108 Another Uzbek
region, the Khojand, the northern portion of modern-day Tajikistan, was transferred to the Tajik SSR
in 1929. 109
According to official figures, 24 percent of Tajiks, 16 percent of Uzbeks, 12 percent of
Kyrgyzes, and 7 percent of Turkmens remained outside their own socialist republics at the end of the
national delimitation. Long before the national delimitation, the four Anglo-Russian agreements
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concluded between 1870 and 1890 had also divided Tajiks, Turkmens, and Uzbeks so that half of the
Tajiks, 10 percent of the Uzbeks, and 9 percent of the Turkmens had become the subjects of the Afghan
Khans. 110
Besides the "equalization" of Central Asian socialist republics, according to Professor Allvvorth.
there was one more reason for the national delimitation. It was Russians" perception that, the Uzbeks"
dynastic legacy (legacies of Genghis Khan and Amir Timur) and cultural power constituted a three-way
threat to Russia. In Allwortrfs words, 111
(1) They [Uzbeks] stretched across much of settled Central Asia in sufficient
numbers to participate in the culture and society of the entire southern
territory;
(2) If they continued to engage in politics of the areas they inhabited, the
Uzbeks would carry a strong potential for influence in local affairs;
(3) More than any other part of the Central Asian population, the Uzbeks
exerted a pull of assimilation on others that expanded the Uzbek population
and enhanced their reach in nearly every field.
Because of this perception, Ailworth suggests, "segregating the Uzbeks became the cornerstone
of the Soviet drive to divide Central Asians into six administrative units instead of the three that
previously existed."112 In fact, the Uzbeks constituted over forty-one percent of the population of
Turkistan SSR, seventy-nine percent of the population of the Khorazm PR, and about fifty percent of
the population of Bukhara PR before "national delimitation." 113 However, their segregation with
"artificial boundaries"114 has not been able to cut their ties with each other. Professor Gleason gives the
following example for their ties and the concept of loyalty: "In some northern portions of Tojikistan.
many people referred to Uzbekistan's president, Islam Karimov, . . . , as Islam-aka (Father Islam)."115
A general observation about Uzbeks' feelings comes from Professor Rywkin, 116
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An Uzbek may feel Uzbek, Muslim . . . or just part of his extended family, depending
on the situation, the identity of the interlocutor, or just the mood of the moment. Facing
a Kazakh he feels Uzbek, facing a Tatar he feels Turkistani, while confronting a
Christian or a Jew he feels Muslim. A Russian makes him feel all three (Uzbek,
Turkistani, Muslim) and awakens the latent resentment of a native against a settler.
C. CASE STUDIES
1. The Fergana-1 989 Conflict
On June 3, 1989, an ethnic fighting between Uzbeks and Meshketian Turks erupted in the
Fergana Valley. It lasted more than two weeks and was marked by heavy casualties and destruction. In
Sergei A. Panarin's pungent words, it "had all the features of spontaneous ethnic aggression when the
mob is the main actor."117
According to eyewitnesses, the first violence began on May 23 after a dispute about the price
of strawberries in the marketplace in Kubasai, a neighborhood in the city of Fergana. Because he thought
that her prices were too high, a Meshki Turk spoke rudely to a Uzbeki woman fruit vendor and poured
a basket of her strawberries on her head. A fight immediately broke out between Uzbeks and
Meshketians in the market place. However, peace was restored without delay. 118
Ten days after the marketplace incident, on Saturday, June 3, the fighting was resumed by
thousands ofUzbeks in and around the city of Fergana. Their targets were the Meshketian Turks. In two
days, 43 Meshketians and 13 people from the other ethnic groups, Uzbeks, Tajiks, and Russians, were
killed and at least 500 were injured. The latter included at least dozens of Interior Ministry troops which
were sent from Tashkent to Fergana to restore order. Damage to property was also substantial: more than
400 houses and some 1 16 cars and buses had been burnt. 119 Meanwhile, some 5,000 Meshketians were
transported, first, to the refugee camps outside Fergana, and then to Namangan. 120 On June 7, President
of the USSR, Gorbachev, reported that 9,000 soldiers with helicopters and armored personnel carriers
were unable to halt the violence. 121 On June 8, the violence spread to the town of Kokand in the Fergana
117
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Valley. A crowd of several thousand attacked the town militia station, in an attempt to seize firearms
Another crowd of 500-600 Uzbeks assaulted a Ministry of Internal Affairs transport department to seize
the buses in order to go to Fergana to help their Uzbek brethren.
The results of these assaults included six dead and ninety wounded people. Among the wounded
were twenty-one Internal Troops servicemen and six militia workers. The targets of the rioters included
economic infrastructure too. 122 By June 17, the number of the Interior Ministry troops stationed in
Fergana reached to 12,000. They came from other regions of the USSR, such as the Baltic area, Moscow
and the Ukraine. Additionally, on June 1 7, authorities in Tashkent began to send troops into Namangan
and Andijan in order to protect non-Uzbeks.' 23 According to Colonel General Shatalin, head of the main
directorate of internal security forces of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, by June 16, the number
of dead stood at 94. As a result of pogroms and fires, 1.052 houses and other buildings of state
institutions were burned down. A total of 984 people received physical injuries, including 137
servicemen of the internal security forces and 54 militia staff. Throughout the summer of 1989, the
situation in the Fergana Valley, especially in Fergana, Kokand, Tashlak, Margilan, and in other
population centers, remained tense. 124 According to the province newspaper Ferganskaya Pravda, at
the end of July, "Every now and then the abandoned home of a Meshketian Turk will go up in flames or
a shot will ring out in the direction of the night patrol." 125 Even in the middle of October 1989. the
situation in Fergana remained difficult. 126
The victims in this case were Meshketian Turks who had been deported from southern Georgia
during and after WW II. They were forcibly resettled to Uzbekistan, Kazakstan, and K\Tgyzstan. The
total number resettled in Uzbekistan was 42,618. From 1944 to 1956, they were even forbidden to
change their residence in these Central Asian republics. At the 20 th Congress of the Communist Party
of the USSR in 1956, their discriminatory status was partly lifted. Nevertheless, their desire to return
to southern Georgia was not accepted by the Communist Party. Thereafter, their whole political activities
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were aimed at the realization of this goal. During 1962-1989, they send more than 200 delegations to
the authorities in Moscow and Tbilisi, the capital of Georgia, to obtain permission for their return to
southern Georgia. 127
In the beginning the Uzbeks were rather sympathetic with Meshketian Turks' situation since
both of the ethnic groups were related to each other religiously and linguistically. 128 However, in the
course of time the Meshketian Turks' settlements became closed communities, in which they maintain
contacts with each other but reduced to a minimum contacts with the Uzbeks. Meanwhile, their
population reached to 100,000 in Uzbekistan and they became more prosperous than their Uzbek
neighbors. Moreover, they began to consider themselves as separate and superior than the Uzbeks. As
Professor Khazanov put it, 129
... the feeling of separateness, which was operating on the lines of a 'we-they'
opposition typical of all kinds of ethnic differentiation, was further intensified amongst
Meshketian Turks by the development of a kind of superiority complex. Considering
themselves most advanced, they tended to look down upon the indigenous populations
of Central Asia, . . .
The reasons of the conflict, besides the strawberries affair, was declared at least eighteen months
before the conflict. According to R. A. Akhmedov, deputy head of the labor department of Fergana
Oblast Executive Committee, there was not enough work in the oblast for all those wanting it. Those who
could not find a job were primarily young people and their number was increasing every year by 7,000.
Moreover, Akhmedov argued in December 1987 that the people of Fergana lost their hope for the future.
He said, "What can the people of Fergana expect tomorrow? It is no secret that there are rumors going
around about future unemployment."130 In June 1989, the crowds of Uzbeks consisted of Uzbek youths
aged from 16 to 20, drunk or on drugs. 131 During and after the conflict, Russian and Uzbek authorities
insistently said that there were 70,000 able-bodied people who were unemployed for three or four years
in the Fergana Oblast. In these authorities' view, the conflict was the result of widespread unemployment
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among the Uzbek youth. 132 Later, their opinions were also supported by some prominent scholars. Jeff
Chinn and Robert Kaiser. They wrote, "The Uzbek riots against Meshketian Turks in 1 989 were led by
young unemployed indigenes who viewed outsiders as receiving preferential treatment in jobs, wages,
and access to housing." 133 Sergei Panarin added, "Much has been written about certain mysterious
'antireformation forces', allegedly to blame for the Fergana slaughter. Judging by the general nature of
the mass disturbances, a conspiracy seems unlikely
. . . there was an atmosphere of general frustration
among the unemployed Uzbek youth." 134
Recently, one more article about the Fergana- 1989 conflict was published. 135 From this article,
we can learn the perceptions of Uzbeks. How did they perceive the Meshketian Turks in 1989? One
Uzbek said as quoted by the author, "The Meshketian Turks were given the best land when they settled
in Central Asia and they had a lot of money. . . . They took our land. They are greedy and steal our
water." Also, there are two other accounts in this article that tells us the symbols that were used by
conflicting parties. According to one Armenian, "There were fanatics with banners and signs reading
Islamic slogans." To an Uzbek, "some unknown person was going around showing pictures of an Uzbek
girl who had been raped and beaten and was demanding revenge." 'Islamic banners' was also mentioned
by one Russian journalist and eyewitness of events in 1989. 136
2. The Osh-1990 Conflict
One year after the 1989 conflict, on June 4, 1990, one more conflict burst out in the Fergana
Valley. It was between Uzbeks and Kyrgyzes in the Osh region of Kyrgyzstan, a few miles from famous
Fergana and Andijan, on the border of Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. It continued throughout the summer
of 1990. At the end, there were 230 dead ofwhom 132 were Uzbeks, 400 missing, and more than 2,000
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injured people from both sides. Some 500 buildings and 100 cars were burnt and part of the harvest was
ruined. 137 The state of emergency which was introduced during the conflict in 1990 was lifted in
September 1995. 138
Before the conflict sixty percent of the population of Osh was Kyrgyz and twenty-five percent
Uzbek. 139 However, the best land and factories were being controlled by the well-to-do Uzbeks. On the
other hand, unemployment was around sixteen percent in Kyrgyzstan in 1990 and there had been
demonstrations for housing since February 1990. 140 Also, as of June 1990, more than 12,000 residents
of the city Osh were registered on the official waiting lists for housing 141 and approximately 40,000
people were jobless in the Osh region. 142
In June 1990, the reason for conflict was a dispute over 79 acres of farm land which belonged
to a collective farm of Uzbeks. When local authorities allowed the homeless Kyrgyz people of Osh to
build homes on this farmland, Uzbeks demanded that their farmland be returned. In the morning of June
4, Kyrgyz young people began to occupy 79 acres of farm land. While Kyrgyzes were occupying and
partitioning the land, Uzbeks began to gather on the opposite side of the land. At the same time, special-
purpose police detachments arrived on the scene and were stationed between them. By 5:30 P.M.,
Uzbeks numbered 10,000. Police forces, first, made an attempt to drive them off the field. Uzbeks
responded with throwing stone and empty bottles. At 7:14 P.M., police fired warning shots into the air.
Uzbeks again responded with stones, sticks, and other objects that came to hand. Thereafter, police lost
control over the crowds and fighting between Uzbeks and Kyrgyzes began. 143 According to a
correspondent of the Soviet army newspaper, Krasnaya Zvezda, "crowds of young thugs were moving
along the streets and fighting with other thugs." 144 At 10 P.M. a state of emergency was declared.
However, the fighting continued all night.
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The next day, they began to attack regional civil defense headquarters and police stations in
order to get additional guns while the conflict was spreading to neighboring cities. At the same time,
several thousand Kyrgyzes in Frunze (currently Bishkek), the capital of Kyrgyzstan, were demanding to
be transported to Osh to participate in the conflict. A crowd of many thousand Uzbeks ready to go to
help their brethren in Kyrgyzstan stood at the border between Andijan and Osh. 145 According to Vadim
Bakatin, Interior Minister of the USSR, because of the Uzbeks of Andijan "the local clashes may turn
into a conflict between two republics." To prevent a probable confrontation between Kyrgyzstan and
Uzbekistan, they sent 900 Interior Ministry troops, 1,500 regular army soldiers and 450 border guards
to keep the Uzbeks of Andijan in Uzbekistan. 146
On June 6 and 7, in addition to ethnical conflicts, conflicting parties began to attack officials
and state properties. For example, on June 7, an excited crowd armed with sticks, hoes and pitchforks
attacked a district Party committee building, the hospital and the district Internal Affairs department. 14
The next month, ethnic conflict began to turn a resistance movement against the government of
Kyrgyzstan. On July 17, the targets of young Uzbeks were the hostels of two plants and the Osh
Pedagogical Institute, a militia post, and a fire-fighting station. Moreover, Uzbek residents of Uzgen.
a town 35 miles outside Osh, demanded the arrival of a UN commission to Uzgen and a construction of
a road between Uzgen and Uzbekistan. 148 They also began to built barricades on the roads into Uzgen
from Kyrgyzstan to prevent Kyrgyzes from entering the town. 149
From the morning of July 22, groups of Russian-speaking people of Osh started to gather on
the central square of the town. Also, Chairman of the Kirghiz SSR Council of Ministers, the Second
Secretary of the Communist Party of Kirghizia Central Committee, and General Shatalin who was the
Commander ofUSSR Internal Troops arrived at the square to meet the Russian-speaking population.
Those gathered demanded "more resolute measures for establishing order and for returning to normal
as quickly as possible." Officials also noted with concern that the instability and lack of guarantees of
citizens' safety was generating a desire to migrate among the Russian-speaking population. 150
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First, Uzbekistan, along with the other Central Asian states, is experiencing an environmental
disaster because of excessive irrigation. For this reason, Uzbekistan's agriculture based on irrigation can
no longer be sustained.
Second, as a result of historical events, Uzbeks believe that Uzbekistan has been their country
since 6th century. Therefore, they claim that the legitimate ethnic group of Uzbekistan is the Uzbeks and
only the Uzbeks deserve preferential treatment. On the other hand, as it was put by Prince Gorchakov
and later revealed by Dukhovskii, immigrants claim that they modernized Uzbekistan and its "half-
savage nomads." Furthermore, because of their seven-hundred-year-long common histories, there is a
strong enmity between them. The Uzbeks perceive Russians as the executioners 151 of massacred
Kokandians and the others in the years between 1865 and 1918. The Russians perceive the Uzbeks in
two different way: inferior than Russians because the Uzbeks were nomads when modernized Russians
came to Uzbekistan; superior than Russians because the Uzbeks are the inheritors of Uzbeg Khan and
Amir Timur, who once ruled as far as to Moscow.
Third, the Uzbeks of Central Asia preserve their ties with each other and perceive themselves
not only as a citizen of Tajikistan or other states, but also as an Uzbek, Muslim and Turkistani when they
face a Russian.
Fourth, the case of Fergana- 1989 conflict shows that it began spontaneously as a result of
unemployed Uzbek youths' attack on "wealthy and greedy" Meshketian Turks. For Uzbek youth, the
cause of their unemployment was the existence of Meshketian Turks in Uzbekistan even though
Meshketians had been ready to leave Uzbekistan since 1956. What made the Uzbek youth hostile to
Meshketians was the perception of a superiority complex, prosperity, and separate community living of
the Meshketians. Furthermore, this conflict demonstrates that when ethnic groups begin to fight each
other, they invent or revive additional symbols in order to intensify the conflict. As it is revealed by
Armenian, Russian, and Uzbek eyewitnesses, "religious flags and figures" and "photographs of victims"
had been carried. However, they were not carried before the initiation of conflict, but after.
51 Uzbek poetess Gulchehra Nurullaeva uses the word "cellatliklar ' for the past Russian policies toward
Uzbeks. James Critchlow, Nationalism in Uzbekistan
. 1 14-5. The word "cellat" in Uzbek properly means
executioner or butcher.
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Fifth, the case of Osh-1990 conflict presents that it was completely a result of competition
between homeless Kyrgyzes and farming Uzbeks for 79 acres of land. Like Fergana- 1989, it was again
carried out unemployed young Uzbeks and Kyrgyzes.
Finally, both cases and historical evidence show that conflicts of Uzbeks are prone to spread all
over Central Asia and to change very quickly from purely ethnic conflict to a confrontation between
Uzbeks and the rest, including law enforcement forces.
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III. CURRENT ETHNIC, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND SOCIAL ISSUES
First, this chapter examines the current ethnic structure of Uzbekistan and the other Central
Asian States in regard to their Uzbek minorities. Second, it analyzes out-migration of Russian and
Russian-speaking minorities in order to predict the future ethnic structure of Uzbekistan. Relations of
ethnic groups and human rights policy of Uzbekistan are the fourth and fifth subjects of this chapter.
Finally, it analyzes the population growth of Uzbekistan and its likely effect on ethnic relations.
A. ETHNIC STRUCTURE
The four Russian-British agreements on Afghanistan, the national delimitation of the 1 920s, and
more than one-hundred years of Russian rule created six polyethnic states in Central Asia (Table 3.1).
Uzbek minorities in these states live in closed communities in certain areas without intermingling with
the other ethnic groups. They also generally reside in provinces bordering Uzbekistan. These provinces
are the Khojand of Tajikistan with 1.5 million Uzbeks, Chimkent of Kazakstan with 0.28 million
Uzbeks, Osh of Kyrgyzstan with 0.5 million Uzbeks, and six provinces in northern Afghanistan with
approximately 1.5 million Uzbeks. 152
152 Anthony Hyman, Power and Politics in Central Asia's New Republics (London: Research Institute for the
Study of Conflict on Terrorism, 1994) 10; Robert J. Kaiser, "Nations and Homelands in Soviet Central Asia."
in Robert A. Lewis, ed., Geographic Perspectives on Soviet Central Asia (New York: Routledge, 1992) 290;
Lee Schwartz, "The Political Geography of Soviet Central Asia: Integrating the Central Asian Frontier." in
Robert A. Lewis, ed., Geographic Perspectives on Soviet Central Asia (New York: Routledge, 1992) 48;
Ahmed Rashid, The Resurgence of Central Asia: Islam or Nationalism (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Zed Books.
1994)80.
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Table 3.1 Ethnic Struct!jre of Centrail Asian States 153
Uzbekistan Kvrevzstan Tajikistan Afghanistan Turkmenistan Kazakstan Total
Population 22,200,000 4,700,000 6,000,000 22,600,000 4,500,000 16,000,000 76,000,000
Uzbek 74.5% 12.9% 25% 6% 9% 2% 20,726,300
Tajik 4.8% 0.7% 64.9% 25% - - 10,642,500
Kazak 4.1% 0.8% - - 2% 51% 9,197,800
Russian 6.5% 21.5% 3.5% - 9.8% 32% 8,224,500
Turkmen 0.7% - - 6% 73.3% N/A 4,809,900
Kyrgyz 0.8% 52.4% 1 .3% - - N/A 2,718,400
Ukrainian 0.8% 2.5% N/A - N/A 5.2% 1,127,100
Tatar 2.4% 1 .6% 1 .4% - - N/A 692,000
Karakalpak 2.1% - - - - - 466,200
German 0.2% 2.4% - - - 1.9% 461,200
Pashtun - - - 38% - - 8,588,000
Hazara - - - 19% - - 4,294,000
Others 3.1% 5.2% 3.9% 6% 5.9% 7.9% 4,052,100
Note: N/A: Exact numbers of ethnic groups are not available.
Like the Uzbek minority of other Central Asian states, the Russian-speaking population of
Uzbekistan resides separately in certain provinces of Uzbekistan. As it is shown in Table 3.2, most of
them live in Tashkent city, and in Tashkent and Syrdarya provinces. Environmentally hazardous
Khorazm and Karakalpakistan, and ethnically dangerous Andijan and Namangan host fewer Russian-
speaking minorities than the other provinces.
153 Charles Undeland and Nicholas Piatt, The Central Asian Republics (New York: The Asia Society, 1994)
3 1 , 45, 58, 78, 93; Bhavna Dave, "Opposition Finds a Voice in Kazakstan," Transition , 7 February 1 997, 88;
Roger D. Kangas, "Holding the Course in Uzbekistan," Transition , 7 February 1997, 90; Rajan Menon, Central
Asia's Foreign Policy and Security Challenges: Implications for the United States
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(Seattle: The National
Bureau of Asian Research, 1995) 9; Nancy Lubin, "Implications of Ethnic and Demographic Trends," in
William Fierman, Soviet Central Asia: The Failed Transformation (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1 991) 40;
Cynthia Buckley, "Exodus? Out-Migration from the Central Asian Successor States to the Russian Federation,"
Central Asia Monitor . No. 3 (1996): 17; David Nissman, "Turkmenistan: Searching for a National Identity," in
Ian Bremmer and Ray Taras, eds., Nation and Politics in the Soviet Successor States (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 1993) 395.
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Table 3.2 Uzbek anid Russian- Speaking Popiilation in 1989 1 54
Total Uzbek Russian Tatar Korean Ukrainian
(Thousands) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%)
Tashkent City 2,060 44.2 34.0 6.3 2.1 2.9
Tashkent 2,143 50.2 14.6 5.0 3.6 1.3
Bukhara 1,622 75.6 8.2 1.5 0.2 0.8
Syrdarya 1,298 71.2 6.8 2.6 1.3 N/A
Fergana 2,142 81.0 5.8 1.5 N/A 0.5
Samarkand 2,282 77.3 5.0 1.5 0.4 0.6
Surkhandarya 1,250 79.4 3.0 1.4 N/A N/A
Andijan 1,721 87.6 2.6 1.4 N/A N/A
Namangan 1,471 85.1 1.8 1.0 N/A N/A
Qashqadarya 1,596 87.7 2.4 1.3 N/A N/A
Karakalpakistan 1,212 32.8 1.6 N/A 0.7 N/A
Khorazm 1,012 94.7 1.2 0.8 N/A N/A
Total 19,810 71.4 8.3 2.4 0.9 0.8
Note: N/A: Zero, negligible, or data not available.
Secondly, the Russian-speaking population lives mainly in urban areas. For example, by the
1989 census, there were only about 100,000 rural Russians and Ukrainians. 155 However, as it is
presented in Table 3.3, percentages of Uzbeks and Russians in urban areas have been changing in favor
ofUzbeks since 1970. This trend was the result of out-migration of minorities and the high population
growth rate of Uzbeks that will be analyzed in the following section.
154
Uzbekistan: An Economic Profile (Springfield: National Technical Information Service. 1993) 28-9.
155
Peter Craumer, Rural and Agricultural Development in Uzbekistan (London: The Royal Institute of
International Affairs, 1995) 43.
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Table 3.3 Changes in the Percentage of Uzbeks and Russians in the Rural and Urban
Population of Uzbekistan 156
Urban Rural
Uzbek Russian Uzbek Russian
1970 41.1 30.4 79.5 2.2
1979 48.1 24.8 82.8 1.2
1989 53.7 19.5 83.5 0.7
B. OUT-MIGRATION
Out-migration of the Russian speaking population from Central Asian states began in 1976 due
to the deterioration of economic conditions. At the beginning of 1970s, economic stagnation in the USSR
forced Russian government to direct investments toward the European parts of the USSR and neglect
the Central Asian states. This relative economic neglect of Central Asian states continued until the fall
of the USSR and resulted in an out-migration of approximately 1 million people from Central Asian
states between 1979 and 1988, with Russians accounting for 216,883. I57
Beginning in 1989, out-migration intensified and reached its turning point in 1994. In the years
between 1989 and 1994, the number of Russian-speaking people emigrated from Uzbekistan totaled
585,600. Annual out-migration is presented in Table 3.4.
Table 3.4 Out-migration of Russian-speaking Population from Uzbekistan 158
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
Out-migration 41,600 180,000 96,000 75,000 54,000 139,000
Out-migration began to decrease after 1994. According to one Russian analyst, one of the two
reasons for decrease in out-migration was the unwillingness of young male Russians at or near draft age
to relocate to the Russian Federation because of the war in Chechnya. The second reason was the decline
in economic and social conditions of the Russian Federation. 159 According to a survey conducted during
1 994- 1 995 in Uzbekistan, the most important conditions for relocation of the Russian speaking
156
Sergei Nikolaev, "Russians in Uzbekistan," in Shlapentokh, Sendich, and Payin, eds., The New Russian
Diaspora: Russian Minorities in the Former Soviet Republics (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1994) 1 10.
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population were provisions for comfortable housing and a job with matching professional qualifications
(Table 3.5). Only a small number of them were ready to immigrate to the Russian Federation under any
circumstances.
Table 3.5 Most Important Conditions for Relocation 160
(percents of those willing to relocate)
Provision for comfortable housing 42.
1
Provision for any housing 13.9
Provision of a job matching professional qualifications 30.5
Provision of any job 9 1
Removal of property 27.0
Preservation of social guarantees and benefits (pension, seniority, etc.) 25.4
Under any circumstances 9.
1
The author of this survey was a senior researcher at the Institute of Economic Forecasting,
Russian Academy of Sciences. In July 1996, the same author in an article about the immigrants
addressed the lack of capacity of the Russian Federation with the following words, 161
In the next five years, Russia can expect that 39% of Uzbekistan's non-eponymous
population will move here to take up permanent residence. Among them, the percentage
of Russians will be 75%. All of immigrants from Central Asia will be 4 million. This
is not an extreme prediction, . . . but Russia can't even cope with that number.
The economic and social lack of capabilities of the Russian Federation was also declared by other
articles. For example, according to observations of a correspondent ofNezavisimaya Gazeta in October
1996, immigrants from abroad in Yaroslavl were living in dormitories of factories; none of them had
received a housing loan or financial assistance; not a single of them knew what rights or benefits he or
she was entitled to; their families had gone hungry for months; and their children were suffering from
tuberculosis and other diseases. She also informed her readers that, 162
160 Galina S. Vitkovskaya, "Relocation to Russia From the States of Central Asia: Understanding the Decision
to Migrate," in Jeremy R. Azrael and Emil A. Payin, eds., Cooperation and Conflict in the Former Soviet
Union: Implications for Migration (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1996) 1 19.
161 Galina Vitkovskaya, "We Can Expect a Flood of Refugees in the Next Five Years," Nezavisimaya gazeta,
1 1 July 1 996. The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press Vol. XLVIII, No.28 (1996): 19-20.
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Natalya Airapetova, "Yaroslavl Bureaucrats Successfully Battle Russian Citizens from the Near Abroad."
Nezavisimaya gazeta, 26 October 1 996, The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press Vol. XL VIII, No.44
(1996): 19-20.
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In the next five years we can expect a flood of 5 million migrants, mainly from Central
Asia. If Russia plans to continue keeping its citizens in ghettos, deceiving them about
... the receipt of loans, we need to directly inform millions of people of this, not spread
political illusions.
Information of'Nezavisimaya Gazeta is important because its editor-in-chief is a member of the
supervisory council of the Institute of Problems of the Diaspora and Integration. As a result of circulation
of this type of information about the social and economic conditions of the Russian Federation in 1996,
out-migration from Uzbekistan decreased to an average of 130-150 people a day or 50,000 a year. 163
Consequently, considering the total number of Russian-speaking population which is estimated at
2,100,000 in 1997 and their average out-migration, it can be expected that a substantial number of them
will continue to reside in Uzbekistan in the next five years and beyond.
C. ETHNIC RELATIONS
In the first two sections of this chapter, it is concluded that a substantial number of Russian-
speaking people will continue to reside in certain areas, mostly in the cities of Uzbekistan. In this section
their relations with Uzbeks will be analyzed.
First of all, both Uzbeks and minorities have to speak the same language in order to
communicate and therefore to prevent misunderstandings. However, according to the figures of the 1989
census, only 23.8 percent of Uzbeks had a command of Russian as a second language and 4.6 percent
of all ethnic Russians had a knowledge ofUzbek as a first or second language. 164 Also, the percentage
of bilingual ethnic Russians living in Russian concentrations, such as the city of Tashkent and the
Tashkent region, was lower than average. For example, only 24,741 out of 706,885 ethnic Russian
resident of the city of Tashkent could speak and understand Uzbek in 1989. 165
The attitude of Russian-speaking population toward Uzbek language has not changed since
1989. In spite of adoption of Uzbek language as the official language in 1989, the Russian-speaking
population did not show any willingness to learn Uzbek. Quite the contrary, they mobilized support of
163 Roger Kangas, "Russian Emigration from Uzbekistan Continues," OMRI Daily Digest , 22 February 1996.
164
Robert J. Kaiser, "Social Mobilization in Soviet Central Asia," in Robert A. Lewis, ed., Geographic
Perspectives on Soviet Central Asia (London and New York: Routledge, 1992) 262; Cynthia Buckley,
"Exodus? Out-migration from the Central Asian Successor States to the Russian Federation," Central Asia
Monitor, No.3 (1996): 16.
165 Sergei Nikolaev, "Russians in Uzbekistan," in Shlapentokh, Sendich, and Payin, eds., The New Russian
Diaspora: Russian Minonties in the Former Soviet Republics (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1994) 117.
44
political elites from Russia to put pressure on Uzbekistan to grant official status to Russian. 16* They also
began to construct theories about territorial and cultural autonomy of Russian-speaking population
because of their inadequate knowledge of Uzbek.' 67 However, according to Sergei Panarin, 'it is unlikely
that in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan they [' Europeans ' for S. Panarin] will be able to establish even
cultural autonomy." 168
Second, the Russian-speaking population traditionally tends to isolate themselves from Uzbeks.
They do not feel that they are an integral part of the population of Uzbekistan. 169 They continue to
consider themselves the "Big Brother" of the "half-savage and semi-nomad" Uzbeks. For this reason,
they do not accept Uzbekistan as their homeland, and even only 50 percent of them who
intend to stay in Uzbekistan perceive themselves as citizens of Uzbekistan.' 70 In the words of S.
Nikolaev,' 71
Russians living in Uzbekistan . . . assume an arrogant attitude toward the traditions,
language, customs, and habits of Uzbeks and to ignore them altogether in their
everyday life. . . . The sooner the Russians are able to recognize themselves as a
minority, the sooner they will be able to adapt to their new position in the ethnic
hierarchy of Uzbekistan and to the new geopolitical reality of an independent Republic
of Uzbekistan, whose political and economic interests will be oriented not only to the
north, to Russia, but to the world as a whole.
Third, as a result of former policies, an ethnic division of labor continues to divide Uzbeks and
the Russian-speaking population. In 1989, while Russians constituted 8.6 percent of the total population,
they were only 0.8 percent of the workforce in the agricultural sector. At the same time, they constituted
166
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20 percent of industrial-sector workers, 23 percent of communications workers, 25 percent of
administrative personnel, 28 percent of information/computing-sector workers and 38 percent of
scientific personnel.
172 As a consequence of their employment in urban environment, they are also able
to enjoy the advantages of better education, social services and higher wages than the Uzbeks. 173
Furthermore, the Uzbeks and the Russian-speaking population are employed in different factories or
working places. According to observations of V. Mesamed, 174
Uzbeks are on the whole employed at medium-size factories. On the other hand, at the
huge plants situated in areas of Russophone concentration, nonindigenous nationalities
attain 90% of the workforce. This suggests that everyday contact and communication
between the natives and the Russian-speaking population is rather limited and reflects
the situation in colonial or postcolonial societies.
D. HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY OF UZBEKISTAN
In the "Preamble" of the Constitution of the Republic of Uzbekistan, "their adherence to human
rights and principles of state sovereignty" is declared. In Article Four, it is expressed that "The state
language of the Republic of Uzbekistan shall be Uzbek. The Republic of Uzbekistan shall ensure a
respectful attitude toward the languages, customs and traditions of all nationalities and ethnic groups
living on its territory, and create the conditions necessary for their development."175 By the same token,
the Law of the State Language of Uzbekistan guarantees the right to free choice of the language of school
education. 176
The other important articles of Uzbekistan's constitution regarding human rights and minorities
are the followings:
Article 8. All citizens of the Republic of Uzbekistan, regardless of their
nationality, constitute the people of Uzbekistan;
Article 18. All citizens of the Republic of Uzbekistan shall have equal rights
and freedoms, and shall be equal before the law, without
172
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discrimination by sex, race, nationality, language, religion, social
origin, convictions, individual and social status;




Everyone shall have the right to profess or not to profess any
religion.
Naturally, implementation of these articles is more important than their inclusion in the constitution. In
the words of President of Uzbekistan at the sixth session of Uzbekistan's supreme assembly (the Oliy
Majlis), on August 29, 1996, 177
It is necessary to arrange the legislation of the Republic in conformity with the
international standards of human rights protection. There are 70 internationally
accepted standards in the sphere of human rights protection
. . .
Uzbekistan so far has
joined only 15 of them. The Oliy Majlis needs to do a lot in this direction.
In 1996, Uzbek government also allowed some international human rights protection and
monitoring institutions to open offices in Uzbekistan. In April, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty and
in June the Open Society Institute opened their Uzbekistan bureaus in Tashkent. 178
In the sphere of religious freedom, the situation of Orthodox Russian-speaking population in
1 996 was very satisfactory for Patriarch Aleksei II of Moscow and all Russia. To the Patriarch, the
celebration of the 125 th anniversary of the Central Asian eparchy of the Russian Orthodox Church, the
construction of the spiritual center of the eparchy in Tashkent, the restoration of St. Alekseis Cathedral
in Samarkand, and the opening of new churches in Bukhara, Qashqadarya, and Syrdarya "'made it clear
that Russian Orthodox Christianity is respected just as much as the Islam." He also stated that all these
measures helped reduce migration of the Russian-speaking people from Uzbekistan. "9 According to a
recent report of U.S. Department of State, not only Russian Orthodox, but also several other
177
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denominations operate freely in Uzbekistan. "However," the report adds, "tensions arise when churches
attempt to convert across ethnic lines, particularly the conversion of Muslims to Christianity."180
As a conclusion, first, in the Republic of Uzbekistan, legal guarantees for the development and
preservation of basic human rights of all the ethnic groups living there has been improving. Second, as
it was observed by U.S. Department of State and Patriarch Aleksei II, the Uzbek government does not
follow a discriminatory policy toward the religions other than Islam. Finally, since the Law of the State
Language also guarantees the right to free choice of the language of school education, any reason for
conflict cannot be found in the human rights policy of Uzbekistan.
E. POPULATION GROWTH AND CONSEQUENCES
In the case studies of Chapter II, it is argued that one of the major reasons for conflict in 1989
was the problem of unemployment ofyoung Uzbeks because of high population growth. In this section,
population growth of Uzbekistan and its effect on employment will be analyzed.
The population of Uzbekistan more than tripled between 1951 and 1989. Thus Uzbekistan, with
44.5 people per square km, became the most densely populated state of Central Asia (Table 3.6).
Furthermore, the most densely populated rural areas of all the USSR were the rural settlements of
Uzbekistan, such as the Fergana Valley, Jizzakh, Bukhara, and Samarkand. On an oblast basis, the
degree of density was even greater. Three of the four most densely populated oblasts of Central Asia
were all located in the Fergana Valley: Andijan. Fergana, and Namangan. Andijan was the most densely
populated oblast in the USSR. 181
Table 3.6 Population of Uzbekistan by Year182
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Because of the economic policy of the USSR after 1972 (which is mentioned in the second
section of this chapter) the share of Central Asian states in total investment of the USSR remained very
low. Moreover, the most densely populated regions, Andijan. Namangan, and Fergana, consistently
attracted much less investment than the other regions of Uzbekistan (Table 3.7).
Table 3.7 Relative Per Capita Investments, 1971-85 183
1971-5 1976-80 1981-5
USSR 100 100 100
Central Asian States 76 69 66
Uzbekistan 75 71 68
Jizzakh, Syrdarya 131 141 95
Tashkent 91 84 88
Karakalpakistan 95 93 96
Surkhandarya, Qashqadarya 90 89 77
Khorezm 67 66 62
Bukhara, Samarkand, Nawoiy 59 59 50
Andijan, Namangan, Fergana 50 45 46
One important result of this investment policy was the intensification of unemployment among
the Uzbek youth. 184 And the likely outcome of high population growth and low investment policy was
obvious for many observers of Uzbekistan even in the first half of 1980s. As Professor Nancy Lubin,
a member of the Council on Foreign Relations, wrote in 1984, five years before the Uzbek-Meshketian
conflict, ,85
... for the indigenous nationalities, a perceived worsening quality of life has already
become linked with the presence of "outsiders" in their republic. The possibility of a
more extreme economic slowdown in Uzbekistan . . . would hold immense ethnic
implications which go beyond purely economic considerations alone. It could spark
deep-seated nationalist hostilities and resentments which would be difficult to contain.
Uzbekistan's population growth rate decreased from 2.5 percent per year in the 1980s to 1 .87
percent in 1996. 186 According to current estimates which consider even further decline in the growth rate
183 Ronald D. Liebowitz, "Soviet Geographical Imbalances and Soviet Central Asia," in Robert A. Lewis, ed.
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186 Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook at http://www.odci.gov/cia/
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due to nation-wide family-planning programs, Uzbekistan's population will increase from 22.2 million
in 1997 to 32 million in 2010. As a result, the number of new entrants to workforce by the year 2010
will grow by 61 percent. 187 More explicitly, the working-age population of Uzbekistan will increase by
one million by the year 2000. However, the total number of employees has being declining since 1993.
Furthermore, even today, the statistics of IMF and UN show that the number of underemployed, people
on short-time working and on indefinite unpaid leave, is between one and four million out of an
economically active 8.9 million. 188
There are also two other factors that will likely worsen the ethnic relations. First, as it is shown
in Table 3.3, Uzbeks continued to experience rapid urban growth that will transform rural unemployment
into urban unemployment and lead to ever greater contact and competition between Uzbeks and the
Russian-speaking population in the near future. 189 Second, according to Professor M. Brill Olcott, since
the youth of both Uzbeks and the Russian-speaking minorities are no longer being raised in an
atmosphere of communality and cooperation as their elders were, they will certainly be more prone to
more violent competition. 190 Also in Professor Khazanov's view, 191
In professional, educational, and linguistic respects new migrants to Central Asian
cities are at a disadvantage and meet strong competition from other ethnic
groups. ... It is just these people, unemployed and often homeless, who constitute a
new and growing underclass in Central Asian cities. Dissatisfied, alienated, angry, and
sometimes desperate, they are often particularly hostile toward the Russians and other
ethnic minorities and prove to be particularly prone to extremism, violence, and crimes.
In conclusion, it is found that, first, every Central Asian state has an Uzbek community near to
their common border with Uzbekistan. Secondly, still considering themselves superior than Uzbeks, the
Russian-speaking minorities of Uzbekistan are living in closed communities with a minimum contact
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with the Uzbeks. Their arrogant attitudes and ignorance of Uzbek language, customs, and habits
resemble the behavior of Meshketians in the 1980s. As a result of current downward emigration trend,
they will try to continue to reside in Uzbekistan without changing their habits. Third, the human rights
policy of Uzbekistan is not observed to be a reason for ethnic conflicts. Quite the contrary. Patriarch
Aleksei II has stated that the Uzbek government's policy toward Orthodox Christians is one of the
measures which has reduced migration of the Russian-speaking population from Uzbekistan. Finally,
the population growth of Uzbeks will cause the growth of urbanization and unemployment among them




IV. ASSESSMENT OF PROBABLE REACTIONS TO ETHNIC CONFLICTS
This chapter analyzes the probable reactions of Uzbek minorities and the Russian Federation
to ethnic conflicts in Uzbekistan. First, it presents that there is a strong solidarity among Uzbeks of
Uzbekistan and neighboring countries. Therefore, it speculates that if there is a conflict between Uzbeks
and Russian-speaking population in Uzbekistan, Uzbeks in neighboring countries will entangle in this
conflict on behalf of their brethren. Secondly, the chapter shows that the Russian Federation does not
have any choice other than intervention in conflicts if the Russian-speaking population is one of the
conflicting parties. The last argument of this chapter is an assessment that, due to its military ineptness,
the Russian Federation cannot be successful in stopping conflicts.
A. UZBEK MINORITIES IN NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES
Relations between Uzbek minorities and Uzbekistan since 1991 prove that there is a strong
solidarity among the Uzbeks. One example of this solidarity was demonstrated by the Uzbeks of
Kyrgyzstan during the Osh-1990 conflict which is explained in Chapter II. The next one occurred in
March 1993, when Uzbekistan conducted an unusual military exercise in Kyrgyzstan's Osh region. It
was unusual, according to independent press of Kyrgyzstan, because Uzbekistan had not received
permission from Kyrgyzstan before the exercise. 192 The only official who approved the exercise was the
local governor of Osh. After the exercise finished, Kyrgyzstan signed an agreement with Uzbekistan and
dismissed the governor of Osh. According to the agreement, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan would conduct
military training on each other's territory. 193 One reason for Kyrgyzstan's compliance was the political
activities of its Uzbek minority. Leaders of the strongest opposition to the president of Kyrgyzstan were
and are Uzbek politicians of Osh. One of their persistent demands is a greater political autonomy for Osh
that may eventually cause Osh"s unification with Uzbekistan. Their introduction of a new anthem for the
Osh region in November 1993, was an indicator of their demand. 194
,q2 Bess A. Brown, "Security Concerns of the Central Asian States," in Jed C. Snyder, ed., After Empire: The
Emerging Geopolitics of Central Asia (Washington, DC: NDU Press Publications, 1995) 77.




The Uzbeks of Afghanistan are more prone to cooperation with Uzbekistan than the Uzbeks of
Osh. Afghani Uzbeks live mainly in northern Afghanistan which was ruled by Uzbek Bukharan Khanate
until the middle of 18 th century. 195 According to Professor Magnus, existence of Turkic groups in the
Afghan area can be traced back to the fourth century AD. 196 They were these groups that adopted Uzbek
as their common name during the reign of Uzbeg Khan. From the beginning of Russian conquest of
Central Asia to the end of Stalin's collectivization in the 1930s, the number of Uzbeks and other Turkic
groups in Afghanistan was substantially increased because of their migration from Central Asia. 197
However, they never perceived themselves as an integral part of the so-called Afghan nation. On the
contrary, they always try to preserve their cultural ties with the Uzbeks of Uzbekistan. Even the
Communist coup in 1978 was seen by both Uzbeks of Uzbekistan and Afghanistan as an opportunity
to strengthen ties. 198
Relations between the Afghani Uzbeks and Uzbekistan have significantly increased since the
end of Russian occupation in Afghanistan and the independence of Uzbekistan. In Professor Magnus's
199
view,
[Afghani] Uzbeks have felt the attraction and inducements of closer ties with
Uzbekistan, especially after 1 99 1 when Tashkent became the capital of an independent
state, and one is closely attuned to the welfare of co-ethics along its borders in both
Tajikistan and Afghanistan.
In 1988, in the opinion of Professor Eden Naby, 'The key to the future of the country [Afghanistan] may
in fact rest with the Turkic people of the northern plains."200 In 1995, six provinces (Faryab, Jozjan,
Balkh, Samangan, Baghlan and Kunduz)201 in the north were under the control of Dostum, an Afghani
Uzbek General. His control over those provinces included an effective administration with tax collection
and other state functions.202 Moreover, in the same year, Dostum stated that if Pushtuns (dominant ethnic
195 Asta Olesen, Islam and Politics in Afghanistan (Surrey: Nordic Institute of Asian Studies, 1 995) 2 1
.
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group of Afghanistan since the middle of 1
8
th
century which has been represented by the Taleban since
November 1 994) attacked them, he would declare the independence of the Republic of South Turkistan.
203 After Dostum's statement, the Taleban attacked the 'Turkic people of the northern plains' two times
in May and September 1997, in order to unify Afghanistan under the Pushtuns. Dostum has not yet
declared independence, however. Perhaps, the main reason for his delay is the two victories 204 of the
'Turkic people of the northern plains" over the Taleban as a response to the attacks of the latter
Nevertheless, the Afghani Uzbeks have not abandoned their demand for at least an autonomous region
in the northern Afghanistan. For example, after their first victory over the Taleban, they put forward the
following proposals in order to bring peace to Afghanistan: 205
(1) The Taleban would let northern groups keep exclusive control of the north;
(2) It would stop trying to disarm opposition fighters;
(3) It would agree to an Islamic dispensation.
The main sponsor of the Afghani Uzbeks, on the other hand, has been Uzbekistan since 1991. 206
According to the President of Uzbekistan, his country would "do everything possible so that Dostum will
prevent the Taleban militia" from advancing north. 207 In this context, there were some unconfirmed
claims of independent sources that Uzbekistan provided the Afghani Uzbeks with at
least six Mi-32 helicopters which might have been piloted by Uzbek pilots during the first fighting in
May 1997. 208
Unlike the Uzbeks of Afghanistan and Osh, the Uzbeks of Tajikistan are administrating almost
all Tajikistan with political, economic and military support of Uzbekistan. When Tajik SSR was created
in 1929, Khojand region with its highly developed Uzbek population was transferred from Uzbek SSR
to Tajik jurisdiction. Until the Great Purge of Stalin at the end of 1930s, top leaders of Tajik SSR were
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the politicians from Khojand. By 1946 the Khojandis were in power again. They administered Tajik SSR,
then Tajikistan, until 1992.209 After disintegration of the USSR, Tajikistan became an "independent" and
"democratic" state. Simultaneously, democratic political parties were established by the citizens of
Tajikistan. They were "pro-Communist" parties of Khojandis, Kulobis and Hissaris, and "pro-Islamist"
parties of Gomo-Badakshanis and Gharmis. In fact, "pro-Communists" were Uzbeks whereas "pro-
Islamists" were Parnin people of Tajikistan. 210 Just after independence in November 1991, "communist"
Rahmon Nabiev from Khojand was elected as the President of Tajikistan. However, 'Islamists' from
Gorno-Badakshan strongly opposed to Nabiev and forcibly ousted him in September 1992.
Simultaneously, a full scale civil war developed in Tajikistan between pro-Communists and pro-
Islamists. The Russian 201 st Division and the Uzbek Army and Air Force, also, began then peacekeeping
activities on behalf of the communists. In October 1992, the Tajik Parliament opened in the city of
Khojand instead of Dushanbe, (the capital of Tajikistan,) and communist Emomali Rahmonov from
Kulob was elected as Speaker of the Parliament. Two years after, Rahmonov became the President of
Tajikistan as a result of presidential election and support of Uzbekistan and the Russian Federation. 211
He is still the President of Tajikistan as of October 1997. Also, during the initial stage of civil war, the
Uzbeks of Khojand demanded that their region be united with Uzbekistan. Although their demand was
rejected by the President of Uzbekistan, prospect of unification in the future remained high. 212
B. THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION
On the other hand, an ethnic conflict between Uzbeks and Russians in the future will likely cause
the Russian Federation's intervention. This will complicate the international relations in Central Asia
and probably the internal stability of the Russian Federation. According to Vice-President of the Russian
Center for Strategic Research and International Studies, Dr. Zviagelskaia, the Russian Federation's long-
term interests in Central Asia are the following: 213
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(1) Political and economic stability (the absence of interstate and internal
conflicts and acute economic crises);
(2) The preservation of the various contacts between Russia and the Central
Asian countries and the prevention of a vacuum that can be filled with
forces hostile to Russia;
(3) Ensuring Central Asia's ecological security;
(4) The prevention of the spread of chauvinism and Islamic extremism;
(5) The prevention of terrorism, drug-trafficking and arms-smuggling;
(6) The preservation of communications crossing Russia and access to new
transport arteries and to oil and gas pipelines oriented to the "far abroad"; and
(7) Ensuring the security of the Russian population.
Furthermore, Dr. Zviagelskaia states that conflicts and the fate of the Russian-speaking population, in
addition to political Islam, are the most common subjects that are used in the internal political struggle
in the Russian Federation. Dr. Zviagelskaia's comments on this subject later were also supported by
preeminent American and Russian scholars in a study in 1996. As they wrote regarding the Russian
Federation's interventions in the ethnic conflicts in Ossetia-Ingushetia, Chechnya, Tajikistan. Trans-
Dniestr and Georgia-Abkhazia,214
A related motivation behind the intervention decisions [of the Russian Federation] .
. . has been a felt need to 'look good,' or to save face. . . . Similar pressures to 'look
good' figured in the roles played by various actors leading up to Russia's assault on
Grozny in December 1994. Finally, intervention decisions have been made . . . from
time to time for no more profound reason than the absence of any better ideas.
According to A. Migranyan, advisor of President Yeltsin and a member of the Presidential
Council of the Russian Federation, their decisions on Abkhazia. Ossetia, and Trans-Dniestr conflicts
were just the results of their feeling that the Russian Federation had to save its face. Migranyan writes
that "Russia would not be able to 'sit out' events occurring outside the borders of the Russian Federation
214
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57
without intervening in conflicts along the perimeter of those borders."215 Also, in 1995, declaring that
"there may be cases when the use of direct military force may be needed to protect our compatriots
abroad," former Foreign Minister Kozyrev further emphasized their willingness to save the face of the
Russian Federation. 216
Mr. Kozyrev's statement on this issue was only one of the Russian politicians' expressions that
they were ready to protect ethnic Russians abroad.
217
Their reason for these expressions was the coming
elections for deputies to the State Duma of the Second Russian Federation Federal Assembly in
December 1995 and for the presidential election in 1996. According to public opinion polls at the end
ofMay 1995, President Boris Yeltsin was still standing behind Mr. Yavlinsky and Mr. Zhirinovsky. 218
In the 1991 presidential elections, Mr. Zhirinovsky was one of the candidates who received six million
votes just for saying he would defend Russians abroad. 219 With 6.2 million votes, about seven percent
of the total, Mr. Zhirinovsky was behind Mr. Yeltsin and Mr. Ryzhkov. However, in the parliamentary
election of December 1993, Mr. Zhirinovsky's Liberal Democratic Party became the first party in the
lower-house State Duma by winning 22.8 percent of the total votes. According to a Russian daily, the
Liberal Democratic Party's social base included "Russians in the nearby countries" besides the military-
industrial complex, the Army, the impoverished section of the former Soviet middle class, pensioners,
a section of the working class, and young people. 220
In order to prevent Mr. Zhirinovsky's rising, on November 2, 1 993, just prior to the December
1993 parliamentary election, the Russian Federation Security Council approved a new Russian military
doctrine which contained a provision that suggested the use of the Russian military forces to protect the
interests of Russians living in the FSU. 221 Thereafter, the Zhirinovsky factor has continued to play a
decisive role in the formulation of Russian policies toward the Russian-speaking populations of the FSU.
In the first round of 1996 presidential election, Mr. Zhirinovsky was again one of the leading candidates
with 5.7 percent of the total votes behind Mr. Yeltsin (35.2 percent), Mr. Zyuganov (32 percent), Mr.
215 Andranik Migranyan, "Russia and the Near Abroad," The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press , Vol.
XLVLNo.6(1994):3.
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Lebed, and Mr. Yavlinsky. 222 Mr. Zhirinovsky's platform in this election included a list of "eight
guarantees" in which the seventh reaffirmed his continuous support for Russians abroad. 223
Because of Mr. Zhirinovsky's political activities on behalf of the Russians abroad, the Russian
Federation established the Institute of Problems of the Diaspora and Integration two months before the
1996 presidential election. The director of the Institute was Mr. Konstantin Zatulin. former head of the
Duma's Committee on CIS Affairs. The institute's scholarly body would be headed by Mr. Andranik
Migranyan. The supervisory council would include Russian Federation Minister for CIS Affairs, First
Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Director of the Federal Television and Radio Service, editor-in-chief
of Nezavisimaya Gazeta, head of the Federal Migration Service, eminent diplomats, scholars, and
entrepreneurs. In addition to political, cultural, and economic studies, '"the institute will monitor ethno-
social and military-political conflicts in the CIS. . . and develop recommendations for settling or
preventing conflicts and for . . . peacekeeping operations."224 One statement of Mr. Konstantin Zatulin
on May 6, 1997, was about the fate of near abroad that shows the Zhirinovsky factor was still alive in
the internal politics of the Russian Federation even after the presidential elections of 1996. Mr. Zatulin's
statement was follows: 225
So, I would like to stress that, as we have always said in our Institute, in the Duma and
in the Presidential Council , the fate of the "near abroad" . . . and the fate of Russia are
inseparably bound up.
Therefore, it can be concluded that if there is a conflict between the Russian-speaking and the
indigenous populations in Uzbekistan in the future, and if the situation of Russian-speaking population
requires protection, the Russian Federation will likely try to protect the Russian-speaking compatriots
in order to ensure internal political stability of the Russian Federation. Also, it can be assumed that the
Russian-speaking population will be in need of protection since the initial outcome of these conflicts
depend on numerical strength of conflicting parties.
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However, as it was seen in the Chechnya example, interventions in conflicts may not save the
face of the Russian Federation. The Chechnya adventure of the Yeltsin administration began in October
1991, when the Chechen-Ingush Republic (CIR) declared its independence from the Russian Federation.
As a consequence of this declaration, the Russian Federation imposed a state of emergency on the CIR
on November 7, 1991. Until December 1993, the Russian government's position in regard to the CIR
remained unchanged. 226 It was the victory of Mr. Zhirinovsky in the December 1993 elections for the
State Duma that forced President Yeltsin to change his policy toward the CIR. In one political
commentator's view, 227
The key role in the Duma will most likely be played by Zhirinovsky's faction. . . As a
result, there will be times when the Yeltsinists not only cannot get their own decisions
through but are not even able to block 'harmful' draft constitutional laws. . . . Unless
Zhirinovsky comes to the aid of [Yeltsinists].
Furthermore, just a few days after the parliamentary elections, Mr. Zhirinovsky declared that he would
run for President of Russia in the next presidential election. 228 Because of Mr. Zhirinovsky's enormous
pressure, the Russian administration changed its policy toward Chechnya in the middle of 1994. First,
they initiated a covert operation to overthrow the president of the CIR. However, the operation resulted
in failure on November 26, 1994, when the tanks with Russian crews surrendered on the streets of
Chechnya's capital. 229 Three days after this failure, in a meeting of the Russian Security Council,
President Yeltsin decided to sent regular troops to Chechnya in order to Took good.' According to Emil
Payin, "A more likely explanation of the decision to invade has to do with Yeltsin's belief that 'a small
and triumphant war' would improve his prospects for reelection" in the 1996 presidential elections. 230
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The operation against Chechnya was launched on December 1 1, 1994. At the beginning, the
Russian forces had an 8-to- 1 advantage in manpower. Two weeks after, their advantage increased to 1 9-
to-1. However, in the first eighteen days of fighting, the 255 th and 33d Regiments of the Russian
Federation were completely destroyed by Chechnya's army of 3,000. The 13
1
st Motorized Rifle Brigade
also experienced a defeat during the attack to Groznyi, the capital of Chechnya. 23 ' In P. Felgenhauer"s
words, "The Chechen campaign should have been a showcase of rapid deployment and success by
[Russian Defense Minister] Grachev's mobile forces, but it turned into a disaster."232
What are the reasons for this disaster? To Felgenhauer, the reasons were low manpower, lack
of training, and low morale of the Russian forces due to the lack of funds. 233 For Yeltsin administration
and the Russian military, the disaster in Chechnya was the result of the current structure of the Russian
Armed Forces that required a substantial reform in order to be a reliable force. As President Yeltsin
stated in February 1995, "the army is slowly beginning to get out of hand—the conflict in Chechnya
convinced us once more that we are late with reform of the army."234 According to the Russian Defense
Minister and the Chief of the General Staff, there was only one cause for the slow pace of reform—the
weakening of the country's economy, or in other words the lack of enough funds available to the Russian
military. 235
In a few words, the Russian military reform plan conceived bringing the total strength of the
armed forces down to 1.5 million by the year 1999 or 2000 and the creation of rapid deployment forces
equipped with, for example, directed energy weapons, automatic and automated high-precision systems,
deep-penetration ammunition, and super high-speed data-processing and electronic warfare equipment. 236
However, the economic situation of the Russian Federation in the 1990s was not ready to support this
type of expensive equipment. Even the soldiers of the army could not be fed normally and the officers
were living in undesirable conditions because of financial difficulties. 237
a} Richard F. Staar, The New Military in Russia: Ten Myths That Shape the Image (Annapolis: Naval
Institute Press, 1996) 18-9,39.
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In 1997, the Russian military still is in need of reform and money. Moreover, the near future
does not assure anything other than the continuation of the situation. In Russian Defense Minister's
words in July 1997, 238
It is hard to make promises now, when there is no money, but under the macro-
economic indicators we plan to double officers' wages by the year 2001 and increase
them by about 2.5 times by the year 2005.
On the other hand, as of July 1 997, ninety-five thousand officers did not have their own place to live,
many of them were living in railway carriages, garages, tents, and their workplaces. Also they had not
been paid and they had not flown, sailed, and trained for months. 239
It is very likely that they were these kind of economic difficulties that compelled some Russian
servicemen in Tajikistan to behave in an undisciplined way. As Arkady Dubnov writes that,240
[In Tajikistan], there were many episodes involving illicit sales or theft of Russian
armored vehicles, tanks, and equipment. Some Russian servicemen sold and rented
military supplies directly to the guerrillas. One officer of the Kulyab [Kulob] regiment
. . . stated that, "I'll sell an armored vehicle and buy myself a home in Russia. I do need
a place to live afterwards.
Moreover, according to Moscow correspondent of Time, Tajikistan and the Russian 201 st Division in
Tajikistan became an important drug center in the last few years. The correspondent of Time argues
that,
241
Russia's 201 st Division, . .
.
, is nicknamed "Shop Number One." The 201 st , it is said,
beats the local pharmacy for its range of drugs. "Hash, weed, opium—you name it,"
reports an aid worker who admits buying hashish from the "peacekeepers." In recent
years, drugs have also turned up, more than once, on Russian military aircraft.
Moscow's troops, of course, are not the only ones seduced by drug profits.
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In conclusion, first, it is obvious that there is a strong solidarity among the Uzbeks. Currently,
the Uzbeks of Uzbekistan are supporting their brethren in Afghanistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan
against their adversaries. The Uzbeks in Afghanistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan have also been yearning
for unification with Uzbekistan since 1 99 1 . Therefore, it can be assumed that the Uzbeks abroad cannot
stay indifferent if there is an ethnic conflict between the Uzbeks and the Russian-speaking population
in Uzbekistan.
Secondly, it is also obvious that if there is a conflict between the Uzbeks and the Russian-
speaking population, the Russian Federation will try to protect the latter in order to ensure its own
political stability and save the face of Russian politicians. However, contrary to the expectations,




V. ECONOMIC PROGRESS OF UZBEKISTAN
This chapter examines the economic situation of Uzbekistan and suggests that it is the modest
economic progress of Uzbekistan that has provided peace between its ethnic groups since 1992.
Secondly, it analyzes the requirements of the continuity for economic progress.
Just after independence, the Economist asked whether or not Uzbekistan might experience social
upheaval as a result of rapidly deteriorating living standards. 242 Although an explosion has not yet been
experienced, its realization is getting closer. According to Susan Sachs, Moscow correspondent of
Newsday, women from Margilan were complaining in August 1 997 that there was no work and that thev
could barely afford bread . 243 Located on the outskirts of Fergana, Margilan has always been reads to
exhibit unrest. Since the beginning of 1996, the Economist again has warned its readers about the social
and economic situation of Uzbekistan.
According to 1996 country reports of the Economist Intelligence Unit, foreign sources in
Tashkent claimed that there was growing economic discontent among agricultural sector workers,
particularly in the densely populated Fergana valley.244 The Economist also claimed in October 1996 that
political risk was rising because the population-especially in agricultural sector-was for the first time
starting to challenge President Islam Karimov's hard-line rule. 245 Almost one year later, in June 1997,
again according to the Economist, Uzbekistan's economic decline was quickly gathering pace and, as
a result of this trend, an economic shock was not far off. 246
There are two reasons for recent economic decline and growing discontent among rural
population: (1) the peculiarity ofeconomic reform program of Uzbekistan, (2) the structure of economy
which cannot be sustained any longer by limited and degraded resources (capital, water and land). The
reform program of Uzbekistan is peculiar because it is designed only according to special national
composition' and political stability requirements of Uzbekistan without taking into consideration the
limits of its current resources. This reform program which is presented in the first section of this chapter
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has been successful up until now. However, as it is analyzed in the second section, the continuity of
success requires the exploitation of other potential resources of Uzbekistan.
A. TRANSITION FROM PLAN TO MARKET
The economy of Uzbekistan was conducted according to socialist principles until it became
obvious that socialism was a recipe for disaster. After comprehension of this fact, Uzbekistan, like other
socialist countries, determined to transform its economic policy from socialism to capitalism. It was a
policy of "transition from plan to market" as it is widely known. Principles of this policy are the
following: 247
(1) Liberalization: Freeing up prices, trade, and entry to market;
moving to convertible monetary system; applying
market-determined interest rates;
(2) Stabilization: Reducing inflation; imposing hard budget and
credit policy; containing internal and external
imbalances;
(3) Privatization: Privatizing existing state enterprises and
supporting the development of a new private
sector;
(4) Institutional reform: Establishing clear property rights, legal and
financial infrastucture and effective government;
strengthening the rule of law according to the
demands of market.
As it is expressed in Chapter I, Professor Campbell adds two more principles: "opening the economy
to the external world" and "creating a system of social protection against the costs the transition
imposed on the population."248 Otherwise, Professor Campbell implies, "transition from plan to market"
may result in social explosions. 249
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According to the World Bank, there are two patterns of reform: (1) the all-out approach which
aims to implement the four principles of transition in a single burst of reforms, and (2) the gradual
transition in accordance with inherited economic structure and non-economic factors. In the second
approach, political structure, history, culture, and geography of a country may be taken into consideration
as non-economic factors. 250
Uzbekistan chose the second approach which was labeled as the '"Uzbek model" by Rustam
Dosumov. 251 In the opinion of Mr. Dosumov, (chairman of the Department of Industrial Management
and Marketing at Tashkent State Technical University and an ardent supporter of official economic
policy,) there were social, economic, demographic, geostrategic, historical and psychological conditions
in Uzbekistan that compelled them to choose the gradual transition path. Of those conditions, the second
and the third were the following: the complexity and uniqueness of the demographic situation, and the
particular national composition of the republic. Because of these conditions, in his view, their model
observed the following principles: 252
( 1
)
The priority of economics over politics
;
(2) The supremacy of law and order;
(3) Implementation of a strong social policy that takes into account the
demographic structure of the country;
(4) The gradual, evolutionary formation of a market economy;
(5) The priority of the state in conducting the economic reform; and
(6) The adherence to a separate path for building the new society.
Although Mr. Dosumov insistently utilizes "demographic situation," "national composition"
and "demographic structure," these terms can very well be taken into account as "ethnic structure."
Therefore, one of the main reasons of "Uzbek model" is the existence of Russian-speaking population
in Uzbekistan. Uzbek economists simply wanted to protect the Russian-speaking population's well-being
and prevent their emigration from Uzbekistan. With the words of Mr. Dosumov. their emigration was
250
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a "loss" for Uzbekistan and "that loss must be taken into account" because they were the only skillful
workers and managers in Uzbekistan. 253 Perhaps, Mr. Dosumov's perception that Uzbekistan was in
need of skillful Russian-speaking population was not a demonstration of his colonial education in
Russian, 254 since the Russian-speaking population was and is one of the realities of Uzbekistan.
However, it is another reality that the "Uzbek model" was not a sound model for transition from plan
to market. Considering the principle of "the priority of the state in conducting the economic reform," it
may even be argued that transition to market with their model is impossible.
In fact, after four years of transition, the outcome of the Uzbek model was behind that of almost
all of the other transition economies. In other words, there was little, if any, transition from plan to
market. According to European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), neither of the four
principles of transition had been realized in Uzbekistan by mid- 1 995. 255 In privatization, only 25 percent
of large-scale state-owned enterprise assets were privatized or in the process of being sold. Private sector
share of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) was only 30 percent, whereas it was 60 percent in Albania, 40
percent in Kyrgyzstan and higher than 30 percent in another 15 transitional countries. 256 Moreover,
because of Uzbek government's adherence to the principle of "the priority of the state in conducting the
economic reform," privatization was conducted m a very different way. Uzbek government continued
to retain majority of interests in "strategic sectors," such as energy, fuel and gold mining. In non-strategic
sectors, more than 50 percent of shares were allocated to their workers and managers while the rest was
retained by the government. However, workers' and managers' shares were non-tradable. In agriculture,
the Uzbek government simply transformed state farms into cooperatives or closed joint-stock companies
(with non-tradable shares) without any major impact on enterprise behavior . By early 1995, these
"private" farms controlled 90 percent of agricultural land. 257 According to EBRD, the Uzbek way of
privatization that concentrated ownership in the hands of insiders (workers and managers) could
253
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undermine prospects for rapid restructuring of economic system. Additionally, re-registration of state
farms in new forms of collective ownership would prevent the effective governance and performance. 258
In the area of liberalization, Uzbekistan was again behind Albania, Kyrgyzstan and the other 16
transitional countries by mid-1995.259 First of all. there was not any liberalization in trade since the bulk
of foreign trade was still channeled through state-owned foreign trade companies. Secondly, price
liberalization and state order were not phased out for agricultural products, such as for cotton. Thirdly,
liberalization of wages was not realized. 260 Although the Uzbek government was committed to raising
real wages in the past few years, it was widely applied in urban areas and not to the agricultural sector. 261
Uzbekistan's record in other dimensions, also, was not better than that of privatization and
liberalization. On the institutional reform dimension of transition, for example, Uzbekistan's grade was
only better than Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and Tajikistan. According to the report of the EBRD, the legal
rules on investment were often unclear, legal advice was often difficult to obtain, judicial and
administrative support of the law was rudimentary and administration of the law was deficient. 262 In the
words of the Economist Intelligence Unit,263
The government approaches foreign investment in a traditional Soviet-style manner.
Foreign firms which have technology and processes unavailable to Uzbek ... are
allowed in. However, foreign investment to stimulate management transfer and
introduce competition to the local market is still excluded.
For Uzbek economists, it was not the continuity of tradition. Victor Chjen, (deputy prune minister and
head of the state privatization committee as of April 1996,) for example, argues that they invented their
model which had some features similar to other states but had no analogy elsewhere in regard to their
specific measures. 264 The reasons of their unusual measures can be found in the following table.
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Table 5.1 Revenue and Expenditures265
(as shares of GDP)
1991 1992 1993
Total Revenue (% of GDP) 45.5 34.2 60.9
Tax 17.7 28.1 49.2
Union Grants 19.5 - -
Others 8.3 6.1 11.7
Total Expenditures (% of GDP) 50.6 45.2 56.5
National Economy 18.0 3.7 3.4
Social and Cultural 17.9 16.7 17.5
Programs
Subsidies 8.6 11.8 12.3
State Capital and na 2.9 4.7
Investments
Others 6.1 10.1 18.4
Deficit (% of GDP) -5.1 -11.0 +4.4
As it is presented in Table 5.1, the Uzbek government had to maintain a high level of
expenditures in order to protect its population from the adverse effects of its declining economy. From
the very beginning, the Uzbek economists' main goal was to provide a stable social-political situation
in Uzbekistan. For the realization of this goal, in their opinion, they should implement strong social
protection measures at the expense of the stabilization principle of transition. Although this recipe was
a result ofUzbek economists' misunderstanding ofthe principles of economics, it helped to maintain the
internal peace up to now. For example, according to Uzbek economists, it was the recommendations of
international economic and financial organizations (IMF, the World Bank and the EBRD) that caused
the most rapid deregulation of prices and foreign trade in many countries of the Commonwealth of
Independent States. On the contrary, they argue, it was their model of transition that provided distinctly
better economic and social performance. 266 Instead of contemporary economic principles, even some
Uzbek economists take the following lines of famous Uzbek poet Mir Ali Shir Nawaiy (1441-1501) as
their guide to the future: 267
You set out on your way—but what obstacles stand in your way!
O, how difficult it is to reach your goal.
The World Bank, Uzbekistan: An Agenda for Economic Reform (Washington, DC: 1993) 16.




However, it is obvious that the obstacles that stand in their way included the budget deficits
Although, according to their accounts, their budget gave a surplus in 1993, there was a deficit of 12.2
percent in the estimates of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Also, according to IMF, the budget
deficit was 17.7 percent of GDP in 1994 and 7 percent in 1995. 268 They accommodated this deficit in
three ways: inflation, external debt and exploitation of agriculture.
First of all, as it is presented in Table 5.2, the increased government expenditures were financed
through a huge growth of money in circulation which eventually caused very high inflation rates. As it
is observed by Mr. Garmash, a Russian economist,269
The drop in the population's real monetary income during the reform years (1992-
1995) was so catastrophic .... The level of the population's real income this year
[1996] compared to 1991 will be 41% in Russia, . . ., less than 33% in Azerbaijan,
17% to 20% in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan . . ., 10% in Turkmenistan, 6% in Uzbekistan,
and 1% in Tajikistan.
Furthermore, detaining wage liberalization in rural areas, the burden of government expenditures was
primarily imposed on the rural population. 270
Table 5.2 Money,
,
Consumer Prices and Average Wages271
(% annual average rise)
1991 1992 1993 1994
Money (M2) Growth 132.6 406.3 622.2 na
Consumer Prices 106.0 527.7 857.1 1,314
Index
Average Wages -26.6 45.0 6.9 na
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1993
100 100 100 100 100
107 110 119 130 135
97 102 100 76 59
104 128 105 97 107
Table 5.3 Wage Differentiation in Selected Sectors272






Government 93 104 111 109 119
Secondly, the government expenditures were financed through external debt. Total external debt
stock of Uzbekistan was $9.9M at the end of 1992. 273 It rose to 29 percent of GDP in 1996. 274 As Mr.
Garmash observed in 1 996, "some of the positive factors noted this year (the drop in inflation, the
reduction of the budget deficit, etc.) resulted mainly from increasing the state debt, especially the foreign
debt.''
275
Instead of foreign debt, the Uzbek government would have increased its revenues with taxes,
if Uzbek economists had been able to attract Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) to Uzbekistan.
Macroeconomic stability and development of effective institutional framework have always been
necessary conditions of inflow of the FDI. 276 However, Uzbek economists could not succeed in creating
these conditions because of their "Uzbek Model" which aimed to keep Uzbekistan politically stable.
According to the EBRD's 1996 Transition Report, cumulative FDI in Uzbekistan in 1996 was on the
order of $342. This amount, as per capita, was 28 times less than Kazakstan's, 16 times less than
Turkmenistan's and 3 times less than Kyrgyzstan's attraction of FDI. 277 Had the legal and institutional
frameworks been strengthened, FDI flows would have reached $200 to $250 million a year. 278
The other method to finance government expenditures was the excessive exploitation of
agricultural sector. As aforementioned, institutional structure of agricultural sector has remained
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unchanged until now. The state owns the land279 and the water, dictates what farmers produce and the
inputs they use, determines prices of inputs and outputs, buys and sells agricultural products. 280 Also,
the state orders the amount of output (planned output) of farms and the proportion of output that they
must sell to government enterprises at prices fixed by the state. According to this 'state order system."
first of all, "private" and state-owned farms must fulfill their state order quota before being allowed to
market their 'free' products again at prices determined by the state. However, since there are no other
purchaser, both 'free' and 'quota' products must be sold to government agencies. The only difference
between them is the difference between their prices. For example, the price of 1 MT of seed cotton
procured under the state order (quota) will be Som (currency of Uzbekistan) 16,800 and the price of 1
MT of seed cotton procured over the state order (free) will be Som 24,000 in 1998. 281 Wages of workers
are also determined by government and, in theory, paid by 'private' or state farms' administrations. In
reality, workers are paid randomly for their labor on the farms. They earn money only by selling their
own products (fruit and vegetable) from their own gardens/plots which occupy 9 percent of the arable
land of Uzbekistan. 282
Additionally, as it is presented in Table 5.4, domestic prices of agricultural products are always
determined below international prices, though they are exported at the latter by the state. The net result
of this pricing policy accounts as profit or export taxes that enables Uzbek government to finance its
subsidized expenditures. 283 In 1992, profit from agricultural sector was 0.6 billion dollars, equivalent
to roughly the total value of food (wheat, sugar, etc.) and energy imports which were distributed to urban
population at subsidized prices. 284
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Table 5.4 Ratio of Domestic to International Prices285
(in percent)
1989 1990 1991 1992
Cotton Fiber 15 6 3 16
Wheat 28 27 9 21
Rice 28 30 9 17
Consequently, the Uzbek way of transition has succeeded in keeping Uzbekistan politically
stable until today. Urban population which comprises the bulk of the Russian-speaking population has
been subsidized at the expense of the rural population. Wages in scientific, administrative and industrial
sector have increased while agricultural workers" wages have steadily decreased. Considering the ethnic
composition of these sectors,286 it can be added that protection of Russian-speaking population went well
beyond the subsidy of consumer goods. By doing so, Uzbek economists help prevent the emigration of
skillful Russian-speaking population. Otherwise, the economy and political stability of Uzbekistan would
have shattered.
B. FUTURE OF UZBEKISTAN
Despite Uzbek economists' confidence in the prospects for continuity of political and economic
stability not only m Uzbekistan but also in the greater Central Asian region,287 the future of Uzbek
economy seems uncertain because of the limits of agricultural sector. Figures in Table 5.5 show that
agriculture is the backbone of Uzbek economy. Agriculture, on the other hand, has been dominated by
cotton since the end of 1
9
th
century. Cotton exports, for example, account 60 to 75 percent of total
exports and cotton production provides an important source of employment. 288 However, cotton cannot
support Uzbek economic system any longer.
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Table 5.5 Shares of Sectors289
(as % of total)
Employment GDP Exports
Agriculture 43 5 33 77 5
Industry 13.9 19 13.6
Others 42.6 48 8.9
Shortcomings of cotton economy, according to Professor Craumer of Florida International
University, are the following: 290
(1) Food (meat, bread, milk, etc.) deficit as a result of extensive cotton
sowing;
(2) Lack or insufficiency of agricultural inputs and
(3) Environmental degradation.
Although Uzbekistan traditionally is an agricultural country, it cannot supply its population with enough
food. In 1990, consumption of meat was only 48 percent of the all-USSR level. Milk consumption was
at 59 percent, eggs were at 30 percent, potato consumption was at 29 percent and fruits 64 percent.
Moreover, there were regional differences in food consumption. Contrary to the expectation, the lowest
food consumption could be found among rural population in 1990. Consumption of meat, for example,
was the lowest in the Fergana valley (20-23 kg per person) and highest in the city of Tashkent (81.3 kg),
while milk consumption was 144 kg in Andijan and 376 kg in Tashkent. 291 Since 1992, the government
has reduced the area of cotton by 1 3 percent to allow for more food and feed crops although regional
patterns of food consumption basically have not improved or changed. 292 Because of regional differences
in cotton yields, the allocation of land to food did not consider the requirements of local population. For
example, the area allocated for cotton in the Fergana valley remained more than the other regions though
the Fergana much more densely populated than the others (Table 5.6). Thus more densely populated
regions-Andijan, Namangan and Fergana-are allowed to sow food crops much less than the other
289
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regions. As it is observed by Tom McCray ofUniversity of Kansas, only the production of food and feed
crops can alleviate the economic difficulties of peasants. 293
Table 5.6 Cotton Production in Uzbekistan by Selected Regions294
Rural Cotton Yields Cotton Area Harvest bv
Population centners of as % of all Hand
per hectare of raw cotton per sown area as % of total
arable land hectare. harvest
Fergana Regions
Andijan 6.7 28.2 54.4 76
Namangan 5.3 29.5 49.0 80
Fergana 6.5 28.9 46.3 93
Others
Bukhara 4.3 24.0 52.6 81
Samarkand 3.8 26.9 25.2 72
Karakalpakistan 1.6 15.8 36.0 60
Khorazm 4.1 9.1 47.7 89
Additionally, as it is presented in Table 5.6, almost all the cotton in Fergana regions is harvested
by hand-picking. A hectare of cotton harvest by hand-picking requires about 3,400 man-hours, while
mechanized harvest of same amount can be completed in 500 to 600 hours. 295 Perhaps, if there were not
the 'state order system,' the lack of machines for harvest would not have been important. Nevertheless,
under the current system, all the member of villages (yesterday's socialist kolkhozes or today's "private"
farms) must work in the fields to pick cotton for a minimum wage which is also paid occasionally.
According to an observer, in 1 997, "Students, children, industrial workers, soldiers, clerks and drivers
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Results of this system in the Fergana valley are the following:
( 1
)
The peasants' violent discontent; 297
(2) An increase in the unemployment rate to 20 to 35 percent in the estimates
of the UN; 298
(3) The UN Development Agency's plan to launch a special development
project299 and
(4) A substantial increase in drug trafficking from Afghanistan to Europe via
Tajikistan-Osh-Andijan-Tashkent. 300
The goal of the UN Development Agency reveals the situation of Fergana valley more openly than other
developments. Analysts and managers of the agency say that the probability of a civil strife and ethnic
conflict in the region has been increasing as a result of recent economic, political and social changes.
Lack or insufficiency of agricultural inputs is the second limit of current agricultural system of
Uzbekistan. Professor Craumer writes that the poor quality of fertilizers and defoliants and insufficient
machinery not only cause loss in the harvest but also require excessive use of hand labor. Production of
cotton harvesters, spare parts, mineral fertilizers, herbicides and pesticides has been falling freely since
the late 1980s as a result of the socialist economic system. According to international observers,301
[In 1997,] the lack of spare parts and replacement equipment for existing, overworked
(planting, harvesting, and processing) equipment is becoming a major problem in
Uzbekistan as well as in the rest of Central Asia. Planting (and replanting) often is
delayed
. . .
Their procurement requires inflow of Foreign Direct Investment for domestic production or hard-
currency for imports. However, as it is mentioned in the previous section, both options cannot be taken
into consideration. Therefore, it seems that agricultural inputs cannot be increased in the short run.
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Another problem of agriculture is environmental degradation. The desiccation of the Aral Sea
and its hazardous effects are mentioned in Chapter II. Additionally, the quality, and therefore the
productivity of soil has been decreasing since the 1980s because of over-irrigation, and over-planting
of cotton. The yields in 1991-4, for example, averaged only 87 percent of yields in 1976-80. 302 Over-
planting would be prevented by usual rotation of cotton and alfalfa. 303 However, since the main hard-
currency source is the export of cotton, the usual rotation is often postponed in order to produce and
export more cotton.
Thus it is obvious that Uzbekistan cannot rely only on its cotton agriculture any longer. Also,
because of the requirements of political stability, it cannot make any substantial change in its current
economic system which depends on cotton. On the other hand, its political stability is again under threat
because of its heavy reliance on cotton. Therefore, Uzbekistan must replace cotton with other sources
in order to preserve its political stability.
Thanks to the geological and geophysical nature of Uzbek lands, natural energy resources offer
an opportunity to remove cotton from its preeminent position. In terms of oil, Uzbekistan is one of the
energy self-sufficient countries of the world since 1995. 304 Until this time, Uzbekistan had imported 4.5
million tons of oil products from the Russian Federation in exchange for nearly half of its cotton crop. 305
Natural gas seems much more promising than oil (Table 5.7). Currently, Uzbekistan exports
around 2 10-320 billion cubic feet of natural gas annually to Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakstan, and
gains $150M-$250M assuming that these countries pay for their gas purchases. 306 Further utilization
ofUzbek natural gas potential requires its export to other markets. For example, considering their poor
energy resources and growing energy demands, Pakistan, India and China offer important opportunities
for Uzbek natural gas exports. 307 Moreover, perhaps not so much, but some of the natural gas deposits
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natural gas potential, Ferganis, Andijanis and Namanganis will be able to subsidy their fellow Russian-
speaking countrymen without working in the cotton fields.
Table 5.7 World Natural Gas Reserves and Production in Selected Countries
Country Rank Reserve, 1996309 Production, 1994310
(according to reserves) (trillion cubic feet) (trillion cubic feet/year)
The Russian Federation 1 1,750 21.50
Iran 2 740 1.12
Turkmenistan 3 535 1.20
Qatar 4 250 0.48
United Arab Emirates 5 205 0.91
Saudi Arabia 6 194 1.33
Uzbekistan 7 168 1.80
Iraq 13 110 0.11
China 20 59 0.59
Kuwait 21 53 0.21
Pakistan 23 27 0.62
Oman 24 25 0.15
India 25 25 0.59
Since Uzbekistan is a landlocked country, export of natural gas requires the construction of
natural gas pipelines from Uzbekistan to customer countries or to seaports near to customers. In
November 1996, after concluding a number of agreements, Uzbekistan took the first step towards the
construction of a gas pipeline from Uzbekistan to Pakistan's Arabian Sea coast. The agreements were
signed by the government of Uzbekistan, Uzbek national gas, oil and pipeline companies. Delta Oil
Company of Saudi Arabia and United Oil of California (Unocal). 3 "
However, the future of this pipeline seems problematic because of perceptions of some
influential Russian economic and political analysts. For example, in March 1997, Nezavisimaya Gazeta
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published an advisory report about foreign relations of the Russian Federation. The report speculated
that the government of the Russian Federation should take all measures necessary-including the
destabilization of Central Asian, Caucasian, Baltic states, and Ukraine—to prevent the developments
supposedly hostile to the Russian Federation. According to the authors of this report, the Russian-
speaking populations in these countries should be used for destabilization. 312 Although the Foreign
Ministry of the Russian Federation denounced this report, the possibility of destabilization will continue
to be taken into account. As was said by Mr. Yevgeny Primakov, Foreign Minister of the Russian
Federation, "Because in politics, intentions are always a variable quantity. But potentials are
constants."313 "What are the sore spots between the two countries [Uzbekistan and the Russian
Federation]?" asks a writer of a Russian daily. Then, she explains that,314
The course Tashkent has charted toward oil independence and the implementation of
a program for domestic auto manufacturing are pushing Russia out of its age-old
positions in the Uzbek market. Another important factor is transportation lines.
Lacking access to the sea, Tashkent has been carrying out foreign-economic activity
through one Ukrainian and two Russian ports-Ilyichevsk, St. Petersburg and
Vladivostok. But today not all roads lead through the territory of Uzbekistan's Slavic
neighbors. Tashkent is seeking alternative routes to the West and the East.
Perhaps, the feasibility of Uzbek gas exports to Pakistan by way of St. Petersburg, for example,
may be evaluated. It is certain that transportation costs of this route will be too high so those potential
customers in South Asia may try to find other solutions to their energy problems. Pakistani academics'
proposal for the redesign of regional borders to link Pakistan with Central Asian countries may be taken
as a sample of other solutions. 315
In conclusion, the continuity of economic progress of Uzbekistan requires the replacement of
cotton with natural gas in Uzbek economy. Only by doing so, "growing tensions," and therefore
probability of ethnic conflicts can be reduced. Otherwise, disastrous developments cannot be avoided.
" Paul Goble, "A recipe for disaster," Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty . April 1 , 1 997.
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VI. CONCLUSION
The facts presented within the thesis make it clear that Uzbeks, as a people, have been living
on the Uzbek lands since the 6 th century. Therefore, they rightfully claim that they are the owner of
Uzbekistan. The existence of the Russian-speaking population in Uzbekistan since 1 865 cannot diminish
their claims. Quite the contrary, as we observe from the past, the existence of Russian-speaking
population caused the uprisings of Uzbek peasants after bloody, but unsuccessful resistance to Russian
occupation.
One important characteristic of the uprisings was their rapid elevation to region-wide ethnic
conflicts (Fergana- 19 16). The contrary was also seen in many other cases when ethnic conflicts changed
into uprisings and resistance movements against the governments (Fergana- 1989 and Osh-1990). Thus
uprisings and ethnic conflicts intertwined in almost all of the cases. Another characteristic of the
instabilities between 1865 and 1990 was a number of common causes: unemployment, hunger,
dispossession and excessive exploitation of the Uzbek peasants. Since the losses of peasants were the
gains ofnon-Uzbeks in the early economic systems, rebellious peasants' targets in the uprisings mcluded
non-Uzbeks and their possessions. Arrogant attitudes of non-Uzbeks toward the Uzbeks also enhanced
the probability of their inclusion as targets. The third characteristic of these instabilities was the
interventions of Russian armed forces on behalf of the non-Uzbeks (in every instance) and the rulers of
Bukhara (in 19 10 and 19 13), Khiva (in 1874, 1875, 1877, 1915 and 1916) and Tashkent (in 1989 and
1990).
At the end of 20th century, Uzbekistan with its Russian-speaking population and economic
difficulties remind one of the past. However, now Uzbekistan possesses promising opportunities for the
maintenance of stability. Moreover, the evidences presented in this thesis indicate that only the continuity
of stability, but without the growth of tensions among the peasants, is in the best interest of other states
of the region and the Russian-speaking population of Uzbekistan. The greater comprehension of these
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